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Kurzfassung
Der Forschungsschwerpunkt dieser Dissertation liegt auf den unterschiedlichen
Quellen von Sicherheitsanforderungen (SRSs), insbesondere auf deren Kate-
gorisierung und Strukturierung. Es wird ein Modell vorgeschlagen, welches die
folgenden Eigenschaften erfüllt, um die aktuellen Herausforderungen aus dem
Stand der Technik und dem Stand der Praxis zu adressieren.
• Umfang: Das Modell ist geeignet für Security-Anforderungen im Bereich
Software, auf Systemebene sowie für technische, physikalische und organ-
isatorische Aspekte.
• Flexibilität: Das Modell ist ausreichend flexibel, um (die meisten) Quellen
für Security Anforderungen zu strukturieren.
• Wiederverwendung: Die Wiederverwendung von Informationen und Wis-
sen wird unterstützt, um unnötigen Aufwand für die Identifizierung, das
Verstehen, die Korrelation und die Anwendung von Elementen aus unter-
schiedlichen Quellen von Security-Anforderungen zu vermeiden.
• Beziehungen: Die Beziehungen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Arten von
Security-Informationen und -Wissen (z.B. diagnostische vs. präskriptive
Informationen) müssen verständlich sein.
• Qualität und Mindestsicherheit: Es ist möglich, die Qualitäts- und Voll-
ständigkeitskontrolle zu unterstützen, um ein Mindestsicherheitsniveau zu
erreichen und die häufigsten Security-Aspekte aus dem Problemraum zu
betrachten.
Das Modell kann bei Organisationen für die Strukturierung und Bere-
itstellung von relevanten SRSs verwendet werden, und darauf basierend
für die Erzeugung eines organisationsspezifischen, wiederverwendbaren SRS-
Repositoriums zu dienen. Das Modell soll zu den konkreten Rahmenbedingun-
gen einer Organisation passen, wie z.B. betroffener Umfang und Bereich sowie
relevante SRSs, die einzubeziehen sind. Der sich daraus ergebende Vorteil für
SRE-Praktiker, die das SRS-Repositorium verwenden, ist eine wiederverwend-
bare, umfassende und konsistente Struktur von SRS-Elementen, die direkt ver-
wendet werden kann, ohne in einem Projekt zusätzlichen, unnötigen Aufwand
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für die Identifizierung, den Abgleich und die Korrelation der verschiedenen
SRSs zu erzeugen. Beziehungen zwischen den diversen SRS-Elementen wer-
den bereitgestellt, die üblicherweise für Praktiker ohne Security-Expertise
nicht ersichtlich wären. Überdies ermöglichen unterschiedliche Sichten auf
das instanziierte Modell einen komfortablen Weg für die Nutzung der SRS-
Elemente, deren Beziehungen und der zugehörigen erläuternden Informatio-
nen je Element.
Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, werden im Rahmen dieser Dissertation fol-
gende Beiträge erstellt:
• Klassifizierung und Beschreibung der wichtigsten wiederverwendbaren
SRSs.
• Entwicklung eines generischen Modells, welches für die Strukturierung und
Wiederverwendung von SRSs verwendet werden kann.
• Entwicklung eines strukturierten Ansatzes zur Instanziierung des gener-
ischen Modells für ein gegebenes Szenario zur Erstellung eines organisa-
tionsspezifischen SRS-Repositoriums.
Das Modell und der Instanziierungsansatz wurden anhand eines Beispiels in-
nerhalb der Siemens AG evaluiert, unter Verwendung von SRSs aus drei ver-
schiedenen Abteilungen, welche um weitere firmenfremde, gängige SRSs aus
IT Security Online-Repositorien ergänzt wurden. In Summe wurden über 500
SRS-Elemente aus acht verschiedenen SRS-Kategorien klassifiziert, strukturi-
ert und in einem wiederverwendbaren, Siemens-spezifischen SRS Reposito-
rium bereitgestellt.
Abstract
The research focus of this PhD thesis is on the various types of existing
Security Requirements Sources (SRSs), particularly on their categorization
and structuring. A model is proposed that provides the following properties
in order to address the current challenges in the state of the art and the state
of the practice.
• Scope: The model can be used for software SRs and for the system level,
as well as for technical, physical, and organizational aspects.
• Flexibility: The model is flexible enough to structure (most of) the relevant
SRSs.
• Reuse: The reuse of information and knowledge is supported to avoid
unnecessary effort for the identification, classification, comparison, corre-
lation, and use of elements from different SRSs.
• Relationships: The relationships between different kinds of security infor-
mation and knowledge (e.g., diagnostic vs. prescriptive) shall be under-
standable.
• Quality and Baseline Security: It is possible to support checks for quality
and completeness of SRs in terms of ‘baseline security’, covering the most
prevalent security aspects of the problem space.
The model can be used by organizations for the structuring and provision
of relevant SRSs and, based on this, the creation of an organization-specific,
reusable SRS repository that fits the particular circumstances of an organiza-
tion, such as the affected scope and domain, and relevant SRSs to be incorpo-
rated. The benefit for practitioners using such an SRS repository is a reusable,
comprehensive and consistent structure of relevant SRS elements, which can
be used without requiring any additional, unnecessary effort for identifying,
comparing, and consolidating different SRSs for each project. Relationships
between the various SRS elements are provided, which normally would not
be clear to practitioners without security expertise. Moreover, different views
on the instantiated model provide a convenient way to make use of the SRS
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elements, their relations and the associated explanatory information for each
SRS element.
To reach this goal the following contributions are developed as part of this
PhD thesis:
• Classification and description of the most important reusable SRSs.
• Development of a generic model that can be used for structuring and
reusing relevant SRSs.
• Development of a structured approach for instantiating the generic model
for a given scenario in order to create an organization-specific SRS repos-
itory.
The model and the instantiation approach were evaluated on the example
of Siemens AG, using SRSs from three different corporate departments, in
conjunction with other non-company SRSs from external state of the art IT
security repositories. In total, over 500 SRS elements from eight different SRSs
were classified, structured, and provided in a reusable, Siemens-specific SRS
repository.
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1Introduction and Motivation
“Unfortunately, most of the work for
traditional requirements engineering
fails to explicitly consider security”
Unknown author, taken from [15]
In this chapter the general introduction and motivation for this PhD thesis
will be described.
First, a categorization of the PhD topic will be given in section 1.1, fol-
lowed by an overview of challenges and research gaps in Security Requirements
Engineering (SRE) related to this work in section 1.2. The business demands
to be solved and the research hypotheses to be verified will be presented in
section 1.3. Moreover, an overview of contributions originating from this PhD
thesis, the selected research approach, as well as the document structure will
be presented in sections 1.4 to 1.6.
1.1 Categorization of PhD Topic
This PhD thesis is concerned with the structuring and reuse of Security Re-
quirements Sources (SRSs) as a basis for the elicitation of Security Require-
ments (SRs). Therefore, it is an interdisciplinary research topic between the
research fields Requirements Engineering (RE) and Security.
RE is the first of multiple phases in the System Development Life Cy-
cle (SDLC). It is a very important phase for development projects since the
overall project success significantly depends on properly developed require-
ments. Furthermore, errors made during the requirements engineering activ-
ities may cause significantly higher effort to rectify them in the later phases.
SRs are developed just like all other functional and non-functional require-
ments in a Requirements Engineering process. However, the sources and tech-
niques for Security Requirements Engineering differ strongly from ‘traditional’
2RE. Most ‘traditional’ requirements elicitation techniques are designed to dis-
cover requirements from human stakeholders. In contrast, it is the goal of
SRE and security in general to identify, analyze, and prevent bad things that
might happen. The aim to prevent harm from occurring to assets, to reduce
the risk for an organization, and to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability. Therefore, SRE requires different types of information, knowledge, and
techniques than ‘traditional’ RE.
1.2 Challenges and Research Gap in Security
Requirements Engineering
SRE is a challenging task, requiring profound security and SRE method knowl-
edge. Although numerous publications state that SRE is important, only lit-
tle concrete and specific advice is provided that can be used immediately in
projects [129]. In the literature on SRE, it is often stated that the application
of SRE methods and techniques in projects and the maturity of Security Re-
quirements (SRs) specifications is mostly poor (e.g., [96, 133]). Moreover, of
the various methods that have been developed for SRE, just a small number
have been used in practice to date [96].
Two aspects contribute to the sparse use of SRE methods and the low
number and poor quality of SR specifications. The first aspect is the lack of
knowledge and skills for security and SRE (e.g., [23]), which is considered one
of the main challenges for the development of proper SRs. If one does not
understand the mindset of an attacker, typical threats and weaknesses as well
as available exploits, the results from the use of SRE methods, particularly
from analysis-oriented methods such as threat modeling or attack tree devel-
opment, will likely not produce the same results and quality as if a security
professional had been involved. The second aspect relates to the various kinds
of security information and knowledge sources that could potentially be used
by the SRE community as sources to support the application of SRE meth-
ods and the elicitation of SRs. With proper selection and reuse of security
information and knowledge, at least some of the skills- and knowledge-related
problems could be addressed. However, Elahi et al. conclude in their survey
on SRE [29] that security information and knowledge sources are seldom used
in practice.
Besides these two aspects, the increasing number of internal and external
compliance obligations is seen as an important source to be considered as in-
put for SRE processes and methods. In practice, compliance obligations are
very important for organizations since non-compliance can have a highly neg-
ative business impact due to delays or may even result in non-certification of
a product or solution. However, compliance obligations are underrepresented
in most of the published SRE processes and frameworks (e.g., [6,69,73,115]).
Although most of them propose the use of certain SRE methods for require-
ments elicitation, they do not explicitly foresee the incorporation of other
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requirement sources such as raw SRs from compliance obligations. Mellado
et al. [73] recommend the inclusion of legal, statutory, regulatory, and con-
tractual requirements; however, they leave open how this should be done in
practice.
Security information and knowledge sources and compliance obligations
differ regarding scope, terminology, extent, and level of detail. Furthermore,
the number and heterogeneity of Security Requirements Sources (SRSs) and
compliance obligations is very high. They can provide information for different
software-, system, organizational, or life-cycle security aspects. As an exam-
ple, the code of practice for information security management [48] provides
a mix of high-level software-, system-, and process-related control objectives
for different predefined security categories such as access control, whilst the
common weakness enumeration [127] provides an online repository with a fo-
cus on software related weaknesses. Sources for SRE are therefore often not
directly comparable in terms of scope, structure, terminology, and level of de-
tail and must therefore be understood and correlated by the practitioner on
a project-wise basis, which in turn requires security knowledge and skills.
As a consequence, development teams and (S)RE practitioners without
security skills and knowledge are caught in the dilemma that they require
security and information sources to overcome their lack of security skills and
knowledge, but at the same time require profound security knowledge and
expertise to be able to identify, classify, compare, correlate and use security
information and knowledge sources to benefit from them.
Therefore, support must be provided to organizations and SRE practition-
ers to incorporate security information and knowledge as well as compliance
obligations in a well-structured and reusable way in order to mitigate the lack
of security skills and knowledge and to avoid unnecessary effort for identify-
ing, understanding, and correlating applicable SRSs on a project-wise basis.
An approach and model is required to:
• classify and structure SRSs according to their scope and intended use;
• compare and correlate elements from different SRSs;
• provide and reuse relevant elements from different SRSs for the required
purpose.
First approaches for the structuring and provision of reusable security in-
formation and knowledge propose the development, use, and improvement
of a requirements repository or a knowledge base. In the SImple REuse of
software requiremeNts (SIREN) approach [130], the requirements repository
is filled with countermeasures taken from MAGERIT [74] that were trans-
lated into SRs. Mellado et al. [73] propose storing and reusing elements from
Common Criteria (CC). Dikanski and Abeck [16] propose the creation of
reusable Security Requirements Analysis Templates (SecRAT) in order to de-
velop and use a knowledge base, offering various pieces of relevant information,
such as security standards, technologies, security models, principles, and poli-
4cies, which can be reused for SRE. Other approaches propose providing SRs
in the form of templates [25] or pattern [11,108]. However, no model or frame-
work exists that combines compliance obligations, security information and
knowledge sources, as well as results and artifacts from SRE methods in order
to support the SRE activities and overcome the above-mentioned challenges.
1.3 Business Demands and Research Hypotheses
The following desired capabilities for an SRS repository were derived from
user stories elaborated by a team of security experts and representatives from
software and system development teams.
The desired capabilities also serve as the research hypotheses, which form
the basis for the validation of the model developed (cf. chapter 3.2) in the
evaluation scenario (cf. chapter 4):
• H1 - Scope: The model can be used for software SRs and for the system
level, as well as for technical, physical and organizational aspects.
• H2 - Flexibility: The model is flexible enough to structure (most of) the
relevant SRSs.
• H3 - Reuse: The reuse of information and knowledge is supported to
avoid unnecessary effort for the identification, classification, comparison,
correlation, and use of elements from different SRSs.
• H4 - Relations between SRSs: The relationships between different
kinds of security information and knowledge (e.g., diagnostic vs. prescrip-
tive) shall be understandable.
• H5 - Quality and Baseline Security: It is possible to support checks
for quality and completeness of SRs in terms of ‘baseline security’, covering
the most prevalent security aspects of the problem space.
1.4 Contributions
The research focus of this thesis is on the various types of SRSs, particularly
on their categorization and structuring. The aim is to address the above-
mentioned problems by supporting organizations with the structuring and
provision of relevant SRSs and, based on this, the creation of an organization-
specific, reusable SRS repository that fits the particular circumstances of an
organization, such as the affected scope and domain, and relevant SRSs to
be incorporated. The benefit for practitioners using such an SRS repository
is a reusable, comprehensive, and consistent structure of relevant SRS ele-
ments that can be used without requiring any additional, unnecessary effort
for identifying, comparing, and consolidating different SRSs for each project.
Relations between the various SRS elements are provided, which normally
would not be clear to practitioners without security expertise. Moreover, dif-
ferent views on the instantiated model provide a convenient way to make use
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of the SRS elements, their relations, and the associated explanatory informa-
tion for each SRS element. To reach this goal, the following contributions are
developed as part of this PhD thesis:
Contribution 1. Classification and description of the most important reusable
SRSs.
Contribution 2. Development of a generic model that can be used for struc-
turing and reusing relevant SRSs.
Contribution 3. Development of a structured approach for instantiating the
generic model for a given scenario in order to create an organization-specific
SRS repository.
1.5 Research Approach, Results and Information
Validation
1.5.1 Engineering Method
The scientific approach used in this thesis is depicted in Figure 1.1. It is based
on the scientific method of the experimental software engineering paradigm [4].
In this engineering method, the world is observed1, a new or better model is
developed2, and the resulting model is validated with regard to explicitly
stated hypotheses3.
The engineering method used for this thesis is structured into the following
four phases:
1. State of the practice observations: To identify the current state of the
practice in SRE, relevant information gathered during the literature re-
view is used in conjunction with the results from informal interviews (con-
ducted by the author) and user stories developed in a project at Siemens.
Thereby, practical shortcomings in current SRE practice as well as desired
model capabilities and business needs for the development of a model for
structuring and reusing SRSs are derived and documented.
2. State of the art analysis: To structure and analyze the state of the art
in SRE and to identify potential research gaps, information is gathered
through a literature review. Furthermore, the desired model capabilities
resulting from the state of the practice observations are incorporated to
identify potential solutions already existent in the state of the art. The
results of the second phase are a state of the art overview incorporating
different kinds of SRSs, methods, processes, and frameworks used for SRE.
Furthermore, the identified research gap in the state of the art is described.
1 cf. phase 1 and 2 of the research approach
2 cf. phase 3 of the research approach
3 cf. phase 4 of the research approach
63. Design and improvement of generic model: For the development of
the generic model, the desired model capabilities and research hypotheses
and the state of the art overview and research gap are used as input
for the design of the generic model. The results of this phase are the
classification of important SRSs to be considered in the model and the
generic model itself. Moreover, an entity relationship diagram describing
the generic model in greater detail is developed as a basis for the fourth
phase.
4. Instantiation and evaluation of the generic model and verifica-
tion of research hypotheses: In the last phase of the research approach,
the generic model is instantiated together with the entity relationship di-
agram using a predefined evaluation scenario. The instantiated model is
validated against the desired model capabilities and research hypotheses.
In addition to the evaluation results, the limitations of the model and
potential future work are described.
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Fig. 1.1. Research approach overview
1.5.2 Additional Validation and Reviews
To receive reviews and feedback from the academic community and indus-
trial practitioners, all contributions and related aspects shown in this PhD
thesis were presented to the Requirements Engineering (RE) and Security
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communities at the Siemens Software Excellence Conference [99], the 11th In-
ternational Workshop on Security in Information Systems (WOSIS’14) [101],
the 1st Workshop on Continuous Requirements Engineering (CRE’15) [102],
the 2nd IEEE Workshop on Evolving Security and Privacy Requirements En-
gineering (ESPRE’15) [104], and in the journals Complex Systems Informatics
and Modeling (CSIMQ) [105] and OBJEKTspektrum [103].
1.6 Outline
This thesis is structured as follows:
In chapter 2 the state of the art and the state of the practice in SRE are
presented, providing the basis for the categorization of reusable sources for
SRs to be used in the model.
All parts of the model for structuring and reusing SRSs are described in
chapter 3. This includes the categorization of reusable SRSs (corresponding
to contribution 1), the developed meta-model and entity relationship diagram
(i.e., contribution 2), the approach for instantiating the generic model, and
all relevant views and resulting benefits of the model.
The evaluation of the model is described in chapter 4 (i.e., contribution
3).
The thesis closes with a summary of the results and contributions along
with the presentation of limitations of the model and the evaluation scenario,
potential future work, and concluding remarks in chapter 5.

2State of the Art and State of the Practice in
SRE
“It requires creativity, experience, and a different mindset
to define the bad things that could happen.” [134]
From a security perspective, the consequences of poor SRE motivate that
security considerations should be made in the earlier phases of the devel-
opment life-cycle (cf. section 2.2.2). In recent years the former paradigm of
‘penetrate and patch’ has been replaced by security software development at
the design and coding stage [65]; however this has not yet reached the RE
phase in many cases. A recent survey [29] indicates that SRs are seldom ex-
plicitly elicited and documented as part of the RE phase, but instead are
mostly considered during the implementation phase.
In the literature on SRE, it is often stated that the application of SRE
methods and techniques in projects and the maturity of SR specifications are
mostly poor (e.g., [133]) or do not exist at all.
In this chapter, an overview of the current state of the art and state of
the practice in SRE will be presented. Besides providing a general overview,
the information serves as input for the derivation of reusable SRSs, as further
used in chapter 3.1.
First, a general introduction to RE and SRE will be presented in sec-
tions 2.1 and 2.2. Thereafter, important aspects of SRE will be described,
structured according to the SRE overview as shown in Figure 2.1. A distinc-
tion will be made between customer and environment, security information
and knowledge sources, and SRE methods. Moreover, an overview of specific
security requirements engineering processes will be provided.
2.1 Introduction to Requirements Engineering
In this section, the general role and importance of RE in software and sys-
tems engineering will be presented, and the particularities of requirements
elicitation will be described.
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Fig. 2.1. SRE overview
The placement of RE in the development life-cycle will be illustrated in
section 2.1.1, followed by an overview of example consequences of poor RE
in section 2.1.2 in order to underline the importance of RE. In section 2.1.3,
an overview of existing definitions and classifications of requirements will be
given. Thereafter, the coarse-grained RE process model will be presented in
section 2.1.4 and an introduction to requirements elicitation and elicitation
techniques will be given in section 2.1.5. Finally, an overview of requirements
sources to be considered according to the existing RE literature and standards
will be provided in section 2.1.5.
2.1.1 Requirements Engineering in the Development Life-Cycle
The traditional SDLC is a commonly accepted model for the engineering of
software and systems. Exemple representatives of software development life-
cycle models are the sequential model (of which the waterfall model is a very
popular form), the V-model, or the spiral model [2]. Although different ter-
minologies regarding the traditional SDLC are used by various authors in the
research community, all basically include similar process phases as shown in
Figure 2.2. Within the SDLC, the first two process phases are concerned with
software and system requirements engineering. As these requirements consti-
tute the basis for all following development activities, all subsequent phases of
the life-cycle benefit from properly developed and documented requirements.
All subsequent phases may in turn suffer from poorly developed requirements,
as presented in section 2.1.2.
2.1.2 Consequences of Poor Requirements Engineering
Although the number of ‘scientifically accepted’ investigations on the conse-
quences of poor RE is very small, the following examples provide an overview
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of the importance of RE. An empirical investigation of the reasons for soft-
ware project cancellation [19] showed that in 2005, approximately 16 percent
and in 2007, 12 percent of software projects (in the scope of the survey) were
canceled before they delivered anything. In total, the rate of unsuccessful or
canceled projects was approximately 34 percent in 2005 and 26 percent in
2007.
The following top three reasons for project cancellations are listed in the
report:
• Too many requirements and scope changes (33 %)
• Senior management not sufficiently involved (33 %)
• Lack of necessary management skills (28 %)
The report shows that poor requirements engineering and management is
one of the most relevant issues for software project cancellations. This per-
ception is further substantiated by the theory, that the costs of correcting
an error increase exponentially with each phase of the systems development
life-cycle that the correction is delayed [5]. Therefore, errors made during the
RE phase have a high impact on the overall success as well as on the schedule
and budget of development projects.
The direct consequences of inadequate RE are [57]:
• The requirements do not reflect the real needs of the customer of the
system.
• Requirements are inconsistent and / or incomplete.
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• It is expensive to make changes to requirements after they have been
agreed.
• There are misunderstandings between customers, those developing the
system requirements, and software engineers developing or maintaining
the system.
These consequences again may lead to the following negative impacts [9, 57]:
• Projects are past schedule and/or significantly over budget. The system
may be delivered late and cost more than originally expected.
• Projects are significantly reduced in scope or are canceled.
• The customer and end users are not satisfied with the system.
• Products are not significantly used once delivered.
• Development teams deliver poor-quality applications.
• The system may be unreliable in use, with regular system errors and
crashes disrupting normal operation.
• If the system continues in use, the costs of maintaining and evolving the
system are usually very high.
These negative consequences show that requirements engineering is of high
importance for the overall success of the software and system development.
RE therefore plays a significant role in the software and systems engineering
discipline.
2.1.3 Definition of Requirements Engineering
In the standards and in the literature related to computer science, several defi-
nitions for the terms requirement and engineering, as well as for the composed
term Requirements Engineering exist. This section will provide an overview
and brief examination of the most relevant definitions.
Definition of Requirement
Typically, there is an implicit understanding of the term requirement such
as “a thing that is needed or wanted” [90]. Transferred to software or sys-
tems, the following definitions of the term requirement can be found: The
ISO/IEC/IEEE standard for RE as a part of systems and software life-
cycle processes [52] defines a requirement as a “statement which translates
or expresses a need and its associated constraints and conditions”. Another
requirements definition given in the Project Management Body of Knowl-
edge (PMBOK) [92] states that it is “a condition or capability that must be
met or possessed by a system, product, service, result, or component to sat-
isfy a contract, standard, specification, or other formally imposed document.
Requirements include the quantified and documented needs, wants, and ex-
pectations of the sponsor, customer, and other stakeholders.”
One software-specific definition of requirement is given in [57], which
states: “Software requirements express the needs and constraints placed on a
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software product that contribute to the solution of some real-world problem”.
Moreover, it is pointed out that “for many types of systems, it is impossible
to separate the requirements for the software from broader requirements for
the system as a whole. As well as software, the system may include computer
hardware, other types of hardware device which are interfaced to the computer
and the operational processes which are used when the system is installed in
some working environment” [57]. Although definitions vary in scope and fo-
cus, they share similar aspects. The following common ground amongst the
definitions can be stated:
• Requirements are conditions or capabilities that must be met or possessed
by software, a system, or a system component.
• Requirements originate from various stakeholder needs, wants, and expec-
tations as well as other constraints. Mentioned examples of stakeholders
are users, sponsors, customers, and ‘other’ stakeholders. “The term stake-
holder generalizes the traditional notion of customer or user in require-
ments engineering to all parties involved in a system’s requirements” [26].
Examples of constraints are contracts, standards, specifications, or other
formally imposed documents.
A comprehensive definition of requirement is given in the ISO/IEC/IEEE
systems and software engineering vocabulary. This definition is also used in
the context of this thesis:
Definition 1. Requirement: “A requirement is
1. a condition or capability needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve
an objective.
2. a condition or capability that must be met or possessed by a system or
system component to satisfy a contract, standard, specification, or other
formally imposed document
3. a documented representation of a condition or capability as in (1) or (2)”
[51].
Requirements are often distinguished by the RE community into functional
and quality or non-functional requirements1. Generally speaking, functional
properties determine what the software is able to do, whereas quality proper-
ties determine how well the system or software performs.
Functional Requirements:
A functional requirement specifies a function that a system or system compo-
nent must be able to perform [2,46]. It is therefore a statement describing what
a product must accomplish to produce required behavior and / or results [37].
“Software requirements by and large are requirements for functionality [. . . ]
1 Please note that quality requirements and non-functional requirements are not
defined uniformly in the literature. In the context of this thesis, quality require-
ments and non-functional requirements are considered synonymously.
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and tend to be expressed in positive terms, e.g., ‘the system must. . . ’ ” [134].
A functional requirement must be testable, meaning that a test case result
must be able to demonstrate whether a requirements is satisfied or not (pass
or fail) [8].
Quality / Non-Functional Requirements:
Quality requirements are global qualities of software or a system, such as us-
ability, reliability, security, and so forth. Quality requirements are also known
as non-functional requirements (or quality attributes, qualities, or more col-
loquially ‘-ilities’) that describe how well a system or software performs. As
quality requirements do not only depend on software, non-functional require-
ments cannot be evaluated without looking at the system as a whole [8].
Traditional requirements elicitation techniques (as presented in section 2.1.5)
and guidelines tend to be more focused on functional requirements than on
quality requirements [134].
“[Quality] requirements are usually stated only informally, are often con-
troversial (for example, management wants a secure system but staff desires
user-friendliness), are difficult to enforce during design and implementation,
and are difficult to validate. Not surprisingly, unmet quality requirements
constitute an important failure factor for software development projects” [80].
While functional requirements can and should provide satisfaction or test cri-
teria to check if a requirement has been satisfied, quality criteria typically
do not have simple yes / no criteria [32, 79]. This makes it more difficult
to validate non-functional requirements, or to determine if a quality require-
ment has been satisfied ‘well enough’ [79]. Non-functional requirements tend
to be stated as crosscutting concerns that may impact much software func-
tionality [8,35]. It is argued that non-functional requirements are an abstract
description of specific software or system functions and thus can be broken
down into, and represented by a set of functional requirement which can be
evaluated regarding satisfaction [8].
Non-functional requirements may not only concern the functional require-
ments but may also constrain the development process or reflect other non-
functional requirement that are not directly related to the product or the
development process, e.g., those resulting from external legal or normative
constraints [57]. Therefore the need to separate functional and non-functional
requirements is inevitable, simply due to the fact that there are non-functional
security requirements that cannot be transferred into a functional require-
ment. An additional important aspect calling for a separation of functional
and non-functional SRs originates from the different scopes of the require-
ments and the respective specifications (i.e., software, system, operational
level). The more ‘functional’ a security requirement is specified in the very
beginning (documented in terms of a design or implementation specification),
the less flexible will be the remaining decision space for the resulting functional
and non-functional requirements.
2.1 Introduction to Requirements Engineering 15
There are two widely accepted and commonly used standards for describ-
ing quality attributes, namely ISO/IEC 9126-1 [50] and its successor ISO/IEC
25010 [46]. The latter defines a quality model for software products and com-
puter systems (in contrast to ISO/IEC 9126-1, whose scope is limited to soft-
ware products) with the aim of providing consistent terminology for specify-
ing, measuring, and evaluating system and software product quality. It com-
plements the IEEE standard for software requirements specifications (IEEE
Std. 830 [39]) and the IEEE guide for developing system requirements specifi-
cations (IEEE Std. 1233 [38]). A more comprehensive overview and discussion
of definitions for the term non-functional requirement can be found in [17].
2.1.4 Requirements Engineering Process Model
Software and system requirements (functional and non-functional ones) are
elicited, analyzed and negotiated, documented, and validated within a re-
quirements engineering process. RE may require several iterations to result
into a final software or system specification.
In the literature, process models and associated process steps for RE vary
slightly. A very common (e.g., [1, 66]) and widely accepted generic process
model for RE in general as well as for SRE is the coarse-grained process
model, introduced by Kotonya and Sommerville [57]. The process consists of
four RE process steps, namely requirements elicitation, requirements analysis
and negotiation, requirements documentation and requirements validation, as
depicted in Figure 2.3. The single activities or process steps are depicted as
cloud icons, to indicate that each step is interleaved with the other process
steps and thus there exist no distinct boundaries. The arrows indicate that,
although the process is sequential in principle, there is a lot of interaction
among the process steps.2
Since this thesis focuses on the elicitation of REs and relevant sources for
it, details concerning the other RE process steps (i.e., requirements analysis
and negotiation, requirements documentation and requirements validation)
are omitted for the sake of readability and brevity.
2.1.5 Requirements Elicitation
“Requirements elicitation is the process of seeking, uncovering, acquiring, and
elaborating requirements for computer based systems” [136]. It deals with di-
verse requirements sources and elicitation techniques [1]. In the literature re-
quirements elicitation is sometimes also referred to as requirements acquisition
or requirements discovery.
2 Please note that other RE process models may also subsume requirements man-
agement under requirements engineering, add additional process step such as a
‘feasibility study’ prior to requirements elicitation, or combine process steps such
as ‘requirements elicitation and analysis’, e.g., as presented in [119].
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Fig. 2.3. Coarse-grained requirements engineering process [57]
Requirements Elicitation Process
As depicted in Figure 2.4, requirements elicitation consists of four main activ-
ities, namely objective setting, background knowledge acquisition, knowledge
organization, and stakeholder requirements collection. The result of the re-
quirements elicitation is a set of raw requirements3, which is further analyzed
and negotiated in the subsequent process step.
Objective setting, the first activity in the elicitation process, is intended to
collect the business goals, describe the general problem to be solved, and iden-
tify other system constraints such as budget, time, or system interoperability
constraints. By knowing the objectives that need to be fulfilled by the sys-
tem, background information about the system can be gathered. Background
information is any kind of information about the organization and its struc-
ture in which the system is to be installed, information about the application
domain or other existing systems which may be replaced by the new system
to be developed. This information provides the basis for the subsequent step.
The third step is knowledge organization, the activity of identifying relevant
stakeholders (such as customers, developers, users, administrators, etc.) and
deriving stakeholder requirements as well as requirements coming from the
application domain. The final activity in the requirements elicitation process
is the collection of all stakeholder requirements, the application domain re-
quirements, and other organizational requirements.
Requirements Elicitation Techniques
Requirements elicitation techniques are methods and skills required to carry
out the elicitation of requirements involving the identified requirements sources.
3 The term ‘raw’ requirement indicates that requirements are not further analyzed
and formulated as so-called well-formed requirements.
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Fig. 2.4. Requirements elicitation process (based on [57])
Requirements elicitation focuses on techniques for the discovery of require-
ments from human stakeholders [1]. A huge number of requirement elicitation
techniques exist, ranging from very intuitive techniques such as reading (i.e.,
visiting the library or surfing the web to locate information about experts’
views of the problem or its potential solutions) [13] to complex and costly
techniques such as prototyping.
The following techniques are examples of frequently referred and described
ones4:
• Interview: Conducting interviews is a commonly used elicitation tech-
nique [57] and the traditional means of requirements elicitation [1]. Stake-
holders are asked – preferably by an expert interviewer or requirements
engineer – to name the problems to be solved and/or their needs; the aim
is to build up an understanding of their requirements [13]. As interviews
are seldom complete and adequate, they should be used in combination
with other requirements elicitation techniques [57].
4 Please note that the presented list of elicitation techniques is by far not complete.
There exist plenty of other possible requirements elicitation techniques, such as
facilitated meetings, brain-storming, research, problem domain story-boarding
etc., which are not listed here. An overview of requirements elicitation methods
such as Quality Function Deployment [93], Feature-oriented domain analysis [56]
or Controlled Requirements Expression [124] is provided in [67]
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• Questionnaires: A questionnaire is a document in paper or electronic
form (email or web-based) containing a number of predetermined ques-
tions, which are distributed to a statistically significant and representative
sample of stakeholders. Profound expertise in questionnaire formulation
and statistical analysis is required [13]. The advantage of questionnaires
is that a large number of stakeholders can be addressed elicitation process
at relatively low costs.
• Scenarios: “A scenario can be defined as a description of a possible set of
events that might reasonably take place. The main purpose of developing
scenarios is to stimulate thinking about possible occurrences, assumptions
relating these occurrences, possible opportunities and risks, and courses of
action” [54]. Scenarios are real-life examples in a given context (instead of
abstract descriptions of system functions) illustrating possible interactions
between users and the system to be developed [57]. Use cases are the most
common form of scenario-based elicitation [1, 121].
• Prototypes: Prototyping is a technique used to elicit and clarify unclear
requirements during the early stages of the development process [13] by
developing an initial version (the prototype) which represents or simulates
the functionality or the final system. A prototype is a model of a system
which is employed to help system designers build an information system
that is intuitive and easy to manipulate for end users [98]. Prototyping can
be very effective to obtain well-understood requirements if people can only
express unclear or fuzzy requirements [13]. Furthermore it is used com-
monly to reduce the risk of developing a wrong system and to verify the
usefulness and feasibility of the system before high development costs are
incurred [57]. Various prototyping techniques exist, from paper mock-ups
of screen designs to beta-test versions of software products [1]. Prototypes
primarily used for the elicitation of requirements are ‘throw-away’ proto-
types, in contrast to evolutionary prototypes [12, 63]. Quality assurance
and non-functional aspects like performance, reliability, and security are
often neglected [57].
• Observation: The idea behind this technique is to observe users as they
carry out their normal work with the goal of understanding the users’
needs from a computer-based system [57]. Observation is of particular
value if user tasks and business processes are too subtle and complex for
their actors to be described easily [1].
• Requirements Reuse: As the name of the technique already suggests,
it is intended to reuse certain requirements already specified for another
system with the aim of using them for the system to be developed. Al-
though stakeholders, constraints, and conceptual aspects of the system to
be developed may vary, a number of situations exist where requirements
may be reused. Examples of such situations are requirements concerned
with the application domain, requirements concerned with the style of
presentation of the information, and requirements that reflect company
policies [57]. The advantage of this technique is that it saves time and
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effort while reducing the risk, as these requirements have already been
analyzed and validated for other systems.
Requirements Sources
There are various potential sources mentioned in the literature on RE that
may serve as inputs for the RE process; however, they are mostly very vague,
which makes it hard for practitioners to specify them in a concrete, reusable
way. Nevertheless, it is important to know about potential source categories
where sources might originate in order to identify and evaluate them prop-
erly. A first example, incomplete set of generic requirements sources is show
in Figure 2.3, in which user needs, domain information, existing system in-
formation, regulations and standards are mentioned. Furthermore, as part of
the requirements elicitation process as shown in figure 2.4, an overview of po-
tential sources for the elicitation of requirements is given. In order to develop
raw requirements, the process indicates various sources such as general ob-
jectives, background knowledge, and stakeholder, domain, and organizational
requirements.
The following inputs are reported in [57] as a set of generic inputs for the
requirements engineering process:
• Existing system information (such as the functionality of the system(s)
to be replaced or other relevant systems that interact with the specified
system)
• Stakeholder needs (e.g. from users, operators, customers, market analysts,
regulators and software engineers)
• Organizational standards (such as internal development practices, quality
management, etc.)
• External regulations
• Domain information (knowledge about the application domain that might
not be explicitly stated by stakeholders)
An alternative view on requirements sources is given in IEEE Std. 1233,
the guide for developing system requirements specifications [38], as depicted
in Figure 2.5.
In this standard, the two main input sources are raw requirements pro-
vided by the customer and constraints and influences coming from the system
environment. A customer is defined as “the person, or persons, who pay for the
product and usually (but not necessarily) decide the requirements” [38]. The
environment is defined as “the circumstances, objects, and conditions that
will influence the completed system; they include political, market, cultural,
organizational, and physical influences as well as standards and policies that
govern what the system must do or how it must do it” [38]. The output of the
collected requirements, the system specification, is developed and provided
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Fig. 2.5. Context for developing a requirements specification (based on [38])
to the customer as a customer representation, in order to clarify the require-
ments and comply to them. Additionally, a technical representation (such as
a picture, drawing, or conceptual image) is provided to the technical com-
munity, which provides further technical feedback. The technical community
includes various roles such as analysts, estimators, designers, quality assur-
ance officers, certifiers, developers, engineers, integrators, testers, maintainers,
and manufacturers.5
2.2 Introduction to Security Requirements Engineering
Security requirements (as part of the total set of requirements) are elicited, an-
alyzed and negotiated, documented and validated within the RE process. Just
like all other software and system requirements, SR elicitation and analysis
may require several iterations to arrive at the final security-specific software
and system specification. However, there are differences between ‘traditional’
and security-specific requirements engineering methods and techniques, which
will be explained in the following.
2.2.1 Security and Security Requirements Engineering
Definition of Security
Security is the “condition that results from the establishment and mainte-
nance of protective measures that enable an enterprise to perform its mission
5 Please note that the customer- and technical representation is not part of require-
ments elicitation, but already part of requirements analysis and negotiation.
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or critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its use of information
systems” [82]. The aim is to protect information and information systems
“from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or de-
struction” [82].
The security community defines three security core principles [7] (also re-
ferred to as “basic requirements” [128], “general security concerns” [32] or
“security categories” [83]) that must be preserved: Confidentiality, integrity
and availability. These core principles are sometimes enhanced by other prop-
erties such as accountability, authenticity, non-repudiation, and reliability.
Definition 2. Security: Security is the preservation of confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability of assets. (Similar to the definition given in [48])
The security core principles are defined as follows (based on [42]):
Definition 3. Confidentiality: The property that information is not made
available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.
Definition 4. Integrity: The property of safeguarding the accuracy and com-
pleteness of assets.
Definition 5. Availability: The property of being accessible and usable upon
demand by an authorized entity.
Definition of Security Requirement (SR)
There is no common agreement on what a SR is [18]. Moreover, existing ap-
proaches do not agree on the extent to which the requirements should state
concrete security measures [129]. This induces uncertainty among RE prac-
titioners about good practice for SR specifications and also leads to hetero-
geneous sets of SRs ranging from a small set of high-level security goals to
extensive lists of functional and non-functional security requirements or even
concrete security measures. Several definitions are found in the literature that
reflect different perspectives on security. Some definitions stem from the soft-
ware or system (requirements) engineering community, while others originate
from the security domain as briefly sketched in the following.
Security Requirements from a Requirements Engineering Perspective:
According to the Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evalu-
ation (SQuaRE) process [46], security is a quality (or non-functional) re-
quirement characteristic, containing the sub-characteristics confidentiality, in-
tegrity, non-repudiation, accountability, and authenticity. Correspondingly,
Haley et al. define security requirements as constraints on the system’s func-
tional requirements (rather than being themselves functional requirements).
“Security requirements express the system’s security goals in operational
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terms, precise enough to be given to a designer/architect. Security require-
ments, like functional requirements, are prescriptive, providing a specifica-
tion (behavior in terms of phenomena) to achieve the desired effect” [32].
This definition also underpins the general requirements engineering princi-
ple, namely that requirements should not specify architectural constraints or
implementation mechanisms (i.e., ‘the how’) but rather provide statements
describing what the system must do (or, with regard to security also describ-
ing what it must not do). Wilander and Gustavsson state that SRs are both
functional and non-functional. “In the functional case they represent abstract
security features broken down into concrete functional requirements. In the
non-functional case they are either restrictions on design and implementa-
tion, or requirements on assurance measures such as security testing” [133].
Kotonya and Sommerville argue similarly, stating that there is no clear dis-
tinction between functional and non-functional requirements, although “it is
often helpful to distinguish requirements which specify system’s functionality
from non-functional requirements” [57].
Security Requirements from a Security Engineering Perspective:
Differentiation between functional and non-functional requirement is not com-
mon in current international security standards and publications such as the
ISO/IEC 2700x series (e.g., [47–49]), Common Criteria [43–45], or the NIST
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organi-
zations [83]. A common definition for SRs in the security domain is: “Security
requirements are those requirements levied on an information system that are
derived from laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, instructions, regula-
tions, standards, guidelines, or organizational (mission) needs to ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being processed,
stored, or transmitted” [82].
“Security is a chain; it’s only as secure as the weakest link. Security is a
process, not a product” [107]. A system consists of much more than just soft-
ware. It is developed, commissioned, used, and maintained by various persons
that depend on the system on the one hand, but on the other hand may also
(deliberately or negligently) put the system at risk. Furthermore, there are
various types of attackers that deliberately try to attack the system. A system
can only be considered secure (and even this is hard or impossible to predict
or claim) if a holistic security concept exists, providing a set of SRs that
again serve as a basis for and adequate design and implementation of protec-
tive measures. The concept of threat- and risk-oriented security engineering
is depicted in Figure 2.6.
Definition 6. Threat: A threat is “any circumstance or event with the poten-
tial to adversely impact organizational operations [. . . ], organizational assets
[. . . ] through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, dis-
closure, modification of information, and/or denial of service” [83].
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Threats and Risks
Security Requirements
Security Measures
Fig. 2.6. Security Engineering Approach (based on [78])
Definition 7. Risk: Information-system-specific risks are “those risks that
arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information
or information systems and consider the adverse impacts to organizational
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation” [83].
Definition 8. Security Measure: Security measures6 are protective mea-
sures prescribed to meet the security requirements and to fulfill the security
core principles.
Security measures are not only limited to software or technical measures, but
also cover physical and organizational aspects, e.g., as stated in [48] or [83].
Some of the security measures have to be implemented in software, while
others have to be ensured by the customer by means of adequate security
measures in the operational environment. In the end, an adequate security
level has to be ensured, meaning that an acceptable level of risk can be
reached. As a simple example illustrating this circumstance, the best pos-
sible user name and password-based authentication mechanism (i.e., technical
measure) may not be sufficient if users or administrators do not change their
initial default passwords or pin their current credentials to the top of their
office desktop screens. Without additional organizational measures to ensure
sufficient awareness amongst users and administrators, the technical security
measure would not provide sufficient (overall) security. Another example is a
piece of software using (and relying) on the certificate store of the underlying
server. Although the software itself might provide good security mechanisms,
the server may be vulnerable, e.g. due to a lack of firewall protection, missing
operating system hardening, insufficient malware protection, or use of default
administrator passwords. The overall security may therefore be compromised
by an attacker due to weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the environment of
the software.
In addition, the following IT security terms and definitions are used
throughout this thesis.
6 Alternative terms for security measure are safeguard and security control.
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Definition 9. Asset: An asset is “anything that has value to the organiza-
tion” [42].
Examples of assets include “a major application, general support system, high
impact program, physical plant, mission critical system, personnel, equipment,
or a logically related group of systems” [82]. Typically, parts of an application
or system, such as information/data, functions, as well as hardware or software
are also considered assets.
Definition 10. Weakness: “Weaknesses are flaws, faults, bugs, vulnerabil-
ities, and other errors in (software) implementation, code, design, or archi-
tecture that if left unaddressed could result in systems and networks being
vulnerable to attack” [127].
Definition 11. Vulnerability: A vulnerability is a weakness in an informa-
tion system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation
that can be directly exploited or triggered by an attacker (similar to definition
provided in [83]).
Based on the given generic definitions of the term requirement related to
the REs and Security domain, for this thesis a Security Requirement is defined
as follows:
Definition 12. Security Requirement: “A security requirement is
1. a condition or capability needed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of a software or system in order to protect valuable assets.
2. a condition or capability imposed by security requirements sources that
must be met or possessed by software or a system.
3. a documented representation of a condition or capability as in (1) or (2)”.
Please note that the definition does not prescribe the level of detail or the
extent to which SRs have an impact on security measures. As far as this work
is concerned, it is at the discretion of the development teams to decide which
level of detail is adequate for a particular project. However, as discussed in
this chapter, it is important that a sufficient level of detail concerning the
problem space is reflected in the requirements, or that it is at least possible to
trace a requirement to its originating source, to ensure that software and sys-
tem architects do not only receive isolated, stand-alone generic requirements,
but know about the originating source of a security requirement, regardless
of whether it was identified via security information and knowledge sources,
compliance obligations, or SRE methods.
Trust Assumptions
Some academic work in the area of SRE (cf. section 2.5.4) explicitly considers
trust assumption in addition to SRs. A trust assumption is “the firm belief in
the competence of an entity to act dependably, securely and reliably within
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a specified context” [30]. “Trust assumptions can be used by a requirements
engineer to help define and limit the scope of analysis and to document the
decisions made during the process” [33]. “The level of trust has an approx-
imate inverse relationship to the degree of risk” [30], which means that if
everything and everyone is trusted, no security threats and risks need to be
incorporated, and therefore no security requirements need to be specified to
address the threats and risks (assuming that no other external constraints
or influences demand security requirements). Unlike software-specific SRs, as-
sumptions cannot be enforced by the software-to-be [58]; however, they should
be documented to ensure that organizations deploying the software in a partic-
ular environment know them and can develop environment-specific security
requirements and measures to fulfill the trust assumptions. Unfortunately,
trust assumption or trust relations are seldom defined explicitly [132] since
most related work focusing on SRs does not put much emphasis on trust [33].
Therefore, if they are specified separately, trust assumptions are counterparts
of SRs and should be documented along with SRs. For exemplary SRE meth-
ods incorporating trust assumptions, please refer to section 2.5.4.
Please note that throughout this thesis, trust assumptions will not be men-
tioned along with SRs as possible output. Nevertheless, the proposed model
and SRSs are also applicable for trust assumptions, of course, since the iden-
tification and structuring of SRSs and the development of an organization-
specific SRS repository can be used for the specification of both SRs and trust
assumptions. Moreover, trust assumptions can be considered a specific type
of SR that must be fulfilled.
2.2.2 Consequences of Poor Security Requirements Engineering
Since SRs are part of the overall requirements specifications, the general neg-
ative impact of poorly developed requirements as described in section 2.1.2
also holds true for SRE. Therefore, shortcomings in the SRE phase can also
have a highly negative impact on the overall project success as well as on
the schedule, budget, and security of the developed software or system, just
like any other type of requirement. In addition to these project-specific as-
pects, SRs also have an additional, more long-lasting influence, which makes
proper SRE particularly important. According to [15], most vulnerabilities
and weaknesses in software systems originate from inadequate or incomplete
SRs. Although the actual financial damage is hard to quantify, security flaws
cause a negative financial impact of several billion USD a year [31]. Thus,
potential threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities that were not identified and
addressed properly during the RE phase may lead to severe negative opera-
tional consequences during the future operation of a software or system.
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2.2.3 Differences between ‘Traditional’ and Security Requirements
Elicitation
‘Traditional’ requirements elicitation techniques (as presented in section 2.1.5)
are primarily designed to seek, acquire, and elaborate requirements, mostly
from human stakeholders. Therefore, this kind of RE is mostly done with
the aim of identifying what the software or system must do in order to fulfill
customer needs and solve practical problems.
In contrast, security is concerned with identifying and preventing the bad
things that could happen, but that must not happen. The objective is to pre-
vent harm from assets and to reduce the risk for an organization in order to
ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability (see section 2.2.1). Risks are
introduced by threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities that might be exploited
by an attacker. Therefore, the security community and the SRE community
primarily require proper information and knowledge, both methods and pro-
cesses, to be able to define what must not happen, which means in practical
terms that potential threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities need to be iden-
tified and analyzed. These are translated into security requirements, which in
turn are the basis for defining proper security measures to counteract the iden-
tified threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities and thus to protect the valuable
assets.
2.2.4 Security Requirements Sources
Unfortunately, only little information about the main sources for SRE is avail-
able and discussed in the literature. Although some examples of potential
requirements sources in the area of IT security do exist [14,15,134], no struc-
tured list, big picture, or overview of security requirements sources (SRS) has
been published to date.
According to ISO/IEC 27001, there are three main sources of security
requirements. The first source results from threat and risk analysis, the sec-
ond source are legal, statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements, and
the third source is a “set of principles, objectives and business requirements
for information processing that an organization has developed to support its
operations” [47].
2.3 Customer and Environment
The first source category that serves as input for the SRE process are raw
requirements, constraints, and influences coming from the customer or the
system environment, according to the ‘IEEE Guide for Developing System
Requirements Specifications’ [38]. In the following, all internal and external
raw requirements, influences, and constraints that are relevant for security are
subsumed under the category Customer and Environment. They are derived
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from analyzing the ‘IEEE Recommended Practice for Software Requirements
Specifications’ [39] and the ‘IEEE Guide for Developing System Requirements
Specifications’ [38] concerning their relevance for security and for reuse. More-
over, they are extended with additional security-specific raw requirements,
influences, and constraints from the security community7.
2.3.1 Criticality of Information, Product or System
It is common practice in the information and IT security community to classify
information and information systems in terms of their “value, legal require-
ments, sensitivity and criticality to the organization” [47] before SRs, con-
trols, or measures are selected or developed. This classification (sometimes
also referred to as categorization) is typically derived from the application of
a (business) impact classification method in which the classification results
for the security objectives confidentiality, integrity, and availability are esti-
mated. The classification result often serves as input for the selection of a
set of recommended or obligatory requirements or controls that need to be
fulfilled in order to protect information, information systems, or products.
A popular example is the combination of the NIST standards ‘Security Cat-
egorization of Federal Information and Information Systems’ [21] with the
associated ‘Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations’ [83]. Similar approaches (consisting of a classification and
a subsequent requirements or control selection step) can also be found in many
companies for different scopes such as enterprise IT systems, products, and
solutions.
2.3.2 Intended Operational Environment
The intended operational environment has an important influence on the de-
velopment of a product or solution. As already explained in section 2.2.1,
software is set up, operated, maintained, and used by various people who de-
pend on the system on the one hand, but on the other hand may also put
the system at risk. Furthermore, there are various types of attackers that de-
liberately want to attack the system. Security measures are not only limited
to software or technical measures, but also cover physical and organizational
aspects, e.g. as stated in [48] or [83]. Some of the security measures have
to be implemented in the software, while others have to be ensured by the
customer by means of adequate security measures in the operational environ-
ment. Schmitt and Liggesmeyer present in [101] a dependency model in which
security aspects, constraints, and influences in the operational environment
7 Please note that there are various other lists of customer, stakeholder and environ-
mental requirements sources (e.g. [14, 57]), which partly use different terminolo-
gies. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the focus on the aspects of (security)
requirements sources presented in the following is considered to be sufficient.
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are grouped into three scope areas, namely software, system in its technical
environment, and system in the organizational environment. All three scope
areas mutually depend on and influence each other. They conclude that the
less predictable the potential operational environment of a software prod-
uct is, the more difficult it becomes to specify valid trust assumptions and
proper security requirements, since constraints and influences are unclear or
may vary significantly. This lack of concrete constraints and influences of the
operational environment on software or systems calls for a greater degree of
variability and quality of security mechanisms in order to fit different fields of
application.
2.3.3 Compliance Obligations
For enterprise systems, as well as for products and solutions, various poten-
tially applicable compliance obligations exist that need to be fulfilled. Exter-
nal compliance obligations represent legally binding or contractually agreed
requirements (i.e., any law, statutory, regulatory, or contractual obligations),
which must be identified and, if relevant, have to be incorporated into the
requirements engineering process. For these kinds of requirements, typically
advice from legal advisers or suitably qualified legal practitioners should be
incorporated to cover and properly interpret the huge range of obligations.
Examples range from regional and country-specific legislation (e.g., data pri-
vacy laws) to domain-specific obligations (such as HIPAA and FDA Part 11 in
the healthcare area, or IEC 62443 [41] for industrial automation and control
systems) or even export control related aspects that have an impact on SRs
or even on security measures. Furthermore, there can also be accreditation,
certification or auditing needs which need to be incorporated into the RE pro-
cess. Besides external compliance obligations, often company- or organization-
internal compliance obligations may also need to be followed, such as informa-
tion and IT security policies, standards, and guidelines. In practice, compli-
ance obligations are very important for an organization, since non-compliance
and the resulting negative consequences may lead to a highly negative business
impact, e.g. due to delays, or may even result in non-certification of a product
or solution. Depending on the respective laws, policies, standards, etc., various
requirements engineering aspects can vary strongly (e.g., the terminology used
and the extent to which the ‘raw requirements’ are specified). For instance,
raw requirements that need to be fulfilled may be named differently, e.g.,
‘security controls’ [48,83]; ‘Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Se-
curity Assurance Requirements (SARs)’ [43], or ‘Foundational Requirements
(FRs)’ [36]. Some of them provide rather high-level goals and security princi-
ples, while others primarily address the solution space (which is typically the
case with security controls). Furthermore, they address and partially also mix
different scope areas such as software, a system in its technical environment,
or even organizational issues. Nevertheless, the raw requirements need to be
initially identified, analyzed, and verified as part of the SRE process.
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Practical experience shows that if there are any formal security compliance
obligations that need to be fulfilled, and if these obligations are provided as
list of relevant requirements or controls, the effort for SRE is primarily spent
on the fulfillment of the compliance obligation, rather than on the application
of SRE processes and methods in a ‘green-field approach’. In such a scenario
SRs are seldom developed ‘from scratch’.
2.3.4 Domain Specifics
Domain specifics are characteristics or restrictions that need to be consid-
ered specifically for a certain domain (e.g., healthcare or process automation).
For some domains, there are domain-specific standards which need to be in-
corporated. A popular example is ISA99/IEC62443 [41] as a series of stan-
dards, technical reports, and related information that define procedures for
implementing electronically secure industrial automation and control systems.
Moreover, there may be domain-specific restrictions, which are the reason why
security cannot be dealt with in the same way in systems from different do-
mains. As a practical example, a typical recommendation for enterprise IT
systems is to frequently and timely patch a system with the latest security
patches. For an industrial product or solution, this is typically only possible
during predefined maintenance periods, or patching might not be foreseen at
all since it might lead to a potential loss of accreditation, e.g., in the case of
safety-critical systems.
2.3.5 Market Influence
The market influences how much a company is willing to invest into security
for their products and solutions. If the market does not demand security,
e.g. because of missing legal and regulatory compliance obligations or a lack
of security awareness on the part of the stakeholders, security will not be
seen as added value and thus not as a selling proposition. In such a case,
typically only the minimum will be invested into security since customers
are not willing to pay for a higher level of security, a certified product, or
security features that are not needed. However, if customers are aware of or
demand a certain level of security, a company may increase its reputation, gain
a competitive edge, and consequently increase its market share with proper
security. Therefore, it is important to investigate which level of security is
demanded by the customers, which security functionality is required as a
minimum, and what the state of the art is. In this regard, it is also important
to know the level of security of competitors’ products and solutions and which
security features or functionality they offer.
2.3.6 Non-Security Needs Influencing Security Requirements
Besides the above-mentioned requirements sources and influencing factors,
there are various other non-security constraints, influences, functional and
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non-functional requirements that can have a direct or indirect influence on
SRs. Various other product quality requirements such as performance effi-
ciency, usability, and maintainability [46] may influence or even be in conflict
with SRs. As an example, a SR concerning the protection of confidentiality
and the integrity of transmitted data may be in conflict with requirements
concerning the efficient transmission of data with as little latency as possi-
ble. These potential conflicts among requirements demand proper integration
of SRE into the overall RE process and, in particular, mechanisms for the
proper analysis and identification of trade-offs between requirements of differ-
ent kinds.
2.3.7 Conclusions concerning Customer and Environment
Which aspects of the source category Customer and Environment need to be
considered cannot be generalized but needs to be clarified and elaborated for
each development project. Market influences and non-security needs influenc-
ing security should be addressed by the overall RE process, as they are not only
specific to security. The criticality of the information, of a product or a sys-
tem is typically incorporated into most SRE processes (e.g., [6,69,73,115]) and
methods through the identification and documentation of critical / security-
sensitive assets as well as the specification of security goals and objectives as a
basis for later process or method steps. The incorporation of domain specifics
and the operational environment is typically done through the development of
artifacts such as system overview, data flow diagrams, or problem frames (cf.
section 2.5). Compliance as one of the most important drivers for security is
a crucial aspect for many organizations. Lots of internal and external compli-
ance obligations exist that may need to be fulfilled. Therefore, SRE processes
should incorporate raw requirements from compliance obligations in addition
to eliciting SRs only via SRE methods.
In practice, compliance obligations are very important for an organizations
as non-compliance may have a highly negative business impact due to delays
or may even result in non-certification of a product or solution. However,
compliance obligations are underrepresented in most of the published SRE
processes and frameworks (e.g., [6, 69, 73, 115]). Although most of them pro-
pose the use of certain SRE methods for requirements elicitation, they do not
explicitly foresee the incorporation of other requirements sources such as raw
SRs from compliance obligations. Only Mellado et al. [73] recommend the in-
clusion of legal, statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements. However,
they leave open how this should be done in practice.
2.4 Security Information and Knowledge
The second source category for the development of SRs is Security Information
and Knowledge. The lack of security knowledge and skills is considered one
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of the main challenges in SRE. Traditional RE techniques are rather focused
on functional requirements than on SRs, and “most requirements engineers
are poorly trained to elicit, analyze, and specify security requirements” [23].
Various methods exist to identify and analyze the threat, attacker, and misuse
perspective. However most of these methods require a certain level of knowl-
edge regarding security and SRE. The quality of the results will improve if
security requirements engineers and architects know about the capabilities of
the attackers, about attacker tools available on the market, and about typ-
ical threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. If one does not understand the
mindset of an attacker, typical weaknesses and available exploits, the results
of a threat analysis are likely to be of limited value. Security information
and knowledge is very multifaceted and made available in various ways for
different purposes. In this thesis, it is subdivided into three sub-categories:
diagnostic, prescriptive and historic, following the knowledge base structure
proposed by Barnum and McGraw [3].
2.4.1 Diagnostic Security Knowledge and Information Sources
Diagnostic security information and knowledge addresses the problem space
by means of ‘the bad things that might happen’. In other words, diagnostic
security information and knowledge describes what needs to be avoided and
should be addressed by SRs as a basis for the design of security measures. It
is therefore a prerequisite for many methods such as threat and risk analysis
since it forms the basis for the identification and analysis of threats as well as
for the evaluation of the resulting risks. Hence, diagnostic security information
and knowledge can directly provide threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities
as input (e.g., in the form of structured lists) to the SRE process for the
elicitation of SRs. Alternatively, threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities can
also be derived via attack patterns or knowledge about exploits and hacker
tools that might be used by an attacker to exploit potentially existing threats,
weaknesses, or vulnerabilities.
Examples of diagnostic information and knowledge sources and their ele-
ments are:
• Security threats: Security threats are often provided as lists of (mostly
generic) threats in risk assessment guides [81], risk analysis methods [40]
and risk management standards [49].
Example security threats are “obtain sensitive information through net-
work sniffing of external networks” [81] and “abuse of rights” [49].
• Security weaknesses and vulnerabilities: Weaknesses and vulnera-
bilities are mostly provided and maintained in online catalogs or com-
munity developed dictionaries such as the Common Weakness Enumera-
tion (CWE) [127] and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
[126]. An example of a security weakness is “CWE-287: Improper Authen-
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tication” [127] and an example of a well-known security vulnerability for
‘OpenSSL Heartbleed’ is CVE-2014-0160 [126].
• Attack patterns: e.g., [111, 125]. An example of an attack pattern is
“CAPEC-242: Code Injection” [125].
• Knowledge about exploits and hacker tools: This refers to the
knowledge about exploitable vulnerabilities and corresponding attacker
tools, e.g., the metasploit framework.
2.4.2 Prescriptive Security Knowledge and Information Sources
Prescriptive security information and knowledge sources provide statements
of practice about what to do when building secure products and solutions.
Prescriptive security information and knowledge ranges from high-level secu-
rity principles (e.g., least privilege principle) via guidelines for various security
topics to rather concrete security controls (e.g., certificate-based user identi-
fication) and specific security design patterns. It can be assigned in many
cases to the solution space, since it mostly prescribes the how in contrast to
the why and what. Therefore, prescriptive security information and knowl-
edge is typically input for the design phase in a development life-cycle and
not necessarily a primary source for the SRE process. The reason why pre-
scriptive security information and knowledge is nevertheless referenced here
as input for SRE is due to the perception: Existing architectures may partly
or fully influence the way problems are structured. It may be useful or nec-
essary to reverse-engineer problems for which a known solution exists from
existing architectural designs [53, 86]. Specification and implementation are
often intertwined in practice [122] since limitations of available implementa-
tion technology may demand a specification change or implementation choices
require the augmentation of the original specification [122]. This perception
was adapted in the context of requirements and architecture in the twin peak
model [86], a simplified version of the spiral model. The model foresees a
concurrent, spiral development process, in which requirements engineers and
system architects work concurrently, and iteratively increase the level of de-
tail of both, the requirements specification and the architecture design. It is a
distinct, but yet intertwined activity of RE and architectural design (cf. sec-
tion 3.1.2). Therefore, prescriptive information and knowledge may provide a
valuable input for the SRE process.
Examples of prescriptive information and knowledge sources are:
• Security (design) principles [88,89]. Examples of security design prin-
ciples are ‘apply defense in depth’, ‘fail securely’, or ‘don’t trust infras-
tructure’.
• Security guidelines [84]. Examples for guidelines are ‘Guidelines on
Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing’ or company-specific
guidelines for security architecture design.
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• Security (design) patterns [109].
• Security control lists [83, 97]. An example control from [83] is “IA-
3 Device Identification and Authentication - The information system
uniquely identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined
specific and/or types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or
more): local; remote; network] connection.”
Prescriptive security information and knowledge is seldom provided to-
gether with information about the problem space that it addresses or with
diagnostic security information and knowledge, respectively. The reason or
motivation for prescriptive information and knowledge sources is therefore
often not transparent to the user community.
2.4.3 Historical Security Information and Knowledge Sources
Historical information and knowledge describes security incidents or vulner-
abilities that were uncovered in real-world products or solutions. The goal
of historical information is to learn from previous incidents or vulnerabilities
in order to avoid making the same mistakes again. Therefore, they provide
valuable input for aspects of diagnostic and prescriptive knowledge.
2.4.4 Dependency between Diagnostic and Prescriptive Security
Information and Knowledge Sources
Diagnostic and prescriptive information and knowledge sources have a strong
correlation, since diagnostic information and knowledge provides the basis for
understanding and motivating the application of prescriptive information and
knowledge. Unfortunately, they are seldom provided together in a stringent
and comprehensible fashion. Therefore, the reason or motivation for the appli-
cation of prescriptive information and knowledge sources (i.e., the underlying
threats, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities) is often not understandable for the
user community.
2.4.5 Conclusions Concerning Security Information and
Knowledge Sources
The knowledge, skills and mindset required for SRE is different from ‘tradi-
tional’ requirements engineering. It is more difficult to define what a system
should not do or to identify the threats to it than defining what it should
do [134]. ‘Traditional’ RE techniques are usually focused on functional require-
ments rather than on SRs. Moreover, “most requirements engineers are poorly
trained to elicit, analyze, and specify security requirements” [23]. Thus, for re-
quirements engineering teams without security expertise, it is important that
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security knowledge and information is provided in a structured, understand-
able, and reusable way, so that it can be incorporated when interpreting com-
pliance obligations, applying SRE methods, and specifying security require-
ments. Thus, to do proper SRE, security knowledge and experience regarding
the problem space (i.e., threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities) is required in
order to identify and analyze the bad things that should be prevented and
to specify adequate SRs. Information about the problem space is mostly cov-
ered in diagnostic information and knowledge sources, making this category
of particular interest for SRE. In addition to diagnostic sources, prescriptive
security information and knowledge sources such as generic SRs, security prin-
ciples, security guidelines, security control lists, and security patterns can also
be very useful for SRE. Although prescriptive information mostly addresses
the solution space, it can be helpful to support the alignment between the
problem and the solution space, where requirements engineers and system ar-
chitects work concurrently, and iteratively increase the level of detail of the
requirements specification and the architecture design. Diagnostic and pre-
scriptive information and knowledge sources have a strong correlation since
the diagnostic sources provide the basis for understanding and motivating
the prescriptive information. Therefore, if security information and knowl-
edge sources are provided, it is highly desirable to combine diagnostic and
prescriptive information and knowledge sources.8
Elahi et al. conclude in their survey on SRE [29] that security knowledge
sources are seldom used in practice. Moreover, diagnostic and prescriptive
information and knowledge sources are rarely provided together in a stringent
and traceable fashion.
2.5 SRE Methods
Traditional RE techniques such as interviews, questionnaires, scenarios, pro-
totypes, or observations are primarily designed for the discovery of ordinary
functional requirements from human stakeholders [1] which are typically not
oriented towards security requirements and therefore will not result in a com-
plete and consistent set of security requirements [68]. The need for additional
security-specific RE methods and techniques results primarily from the fact
that one must first know the bad things that may happen to a system and
what it must not do before being able to define which SRs and measures shall
avoid or prevent these. To achieve this, particular attention is paid in the area
of security to the identification and analysis of threats and resulting risks in
order to protect the system assets by specifying adequate SRs and measures
(cf. section 2.2.1).
8 Since historical information serves as input to diagnostic and prescriptive security
information and knowledge, it will not be treated as a separate source for the
proposed model since it is assumed that it is already covered implicitly.
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Various methods are mentioned and referenced in the literature in the
context of SRE. A more comprehensive overview and comparison of SRE
methods can be found in [20,72].
In this thesis, SRE methods are grouped into analysis-oriented, model-
ing-oriented, and reuse-oriented methods. Furthermore, approaches incorpo-
rating trust aspects are presented.9 Methods that are primarily designed to
reveal threats, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and attacks are assigned to analysis-
oriented methods. Methods that place a lot of emphasis on modeling and
model-related aspects are assigned to modeling-oriented methods. Methods
and approaches that provide techniques or utilize results for security re-
quirements reuse are mentioned in reuse-oriented approaches. Finally, a short
overview of methods incorporating trust aspects will be given.
2.5.1 Analysis-oriented Methods
Analysis-oriented methods are designed to analyze the problem space system-
atically in order to identify threats, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and attacks.
The result is intended to be used as a basis for the specification of SRs.
Prominent methods and techniques are (among many others):
• Abuse cases [64]
• Misuse cases [116]
• Attack trees [106]
• Goal-oriented Requirements Engineering, Anti Goals and Anti Models
[58–60]
• Anti Requirements and Abuse Frames [10,61]
• Threat and risk analysis methods e.g., STRIDE [123] or company-specific
threat and risk analysis frameworks [105].
2.5.2 Modeling-oriented Methods
Another research direction in SRE are methods for improving the capabilities
for modeling SRs or security-specific information. TROPOS [76] and Secure
TROPOS [75] as extensions of the i* modeling language, as well as STS-ml [91]
are common examples. Furthermore, two extensions of the Unified Modeling
Language (UML), namely UMLSec [55] and Secure UML [62] were introduced
as possible ways to improve the integration of security-specific information
into UML. Golnaz et al. present an approach on modeling and analyzing
security trade-offs (e.g., [27, 28]).
9 Please note that the structure is not always clear-cut since analysis-oriented meth-
ods, for instance, also consider modeling aspects, of course. The structure is there-
fore not disjoint but rather intended to provide a coarse-grained classification for
the sake of readability.
36
2.5.3 Reuse-oriented and Pattern-based Approaches
The lack of skills and knowledge for security and security requirements engi-
neering is a common problem and challenge for SRE in development teams (cf.
also sections 1.2 and 2.4). One possible way to overcome skill- and knowledge-
related shortcomings and furthermore decrease the effort for applying methods
from scratch is to reuse the results or artifacts of SRE methods. As examples,
attack trees [106] and misuse cases [117] can be used as methods for cap-
turing and reusing security information and expertise. To standardize and
improve the quality of reusable artifacts, several authors propose the use of
templates for documenting the results of a method, e.g. for misuse cases [115]
and security use cases [24, 115]. Consequently, misuse cases and security use
cases are used in existing SRE processes and approaches (e.g., [73, 115]) to
develop a reusable set of threats and security requirements. Firesmith claims
that requirements can be specified as a limited set of quality factors (and re-
lated sub-factors) and presents examples of a reusable, parametrized template
for SRs [25]. Similarly, SR patterns and boilerplates10 also provide templates
for specifying SRs, but additionally also describe how and when to reuse
these requirements (templates) [94]. SR patterns therefore provide a reusable
set of requirements to solve common security problems in combination with
the associated contextual information. As an example, Withall [135] presents
security-related patterns for access control (registration, authentication, au-
thorization), audit, and privacy aspects among many other requirements pat-
terns. Daramola et al. [11] present a pattern-based approach and related pro-
totype tool that supports the specification of security requirements utilizing
textual misuse cases (TMUC).
To increase the efficiency of pattern-based SR approaches, i.e., to review only
relevant patterns and select the most appropriate ones for a specific situation,
Slavin et al. [118] proposed an inquiry-cycle-based approach combined with a
feature diagram notation.
Another way to reuse security information and knowledge, which was pro-
posed by several authors, is to create a reusable requirements repository or
knowledge base. In SIREN [130], the requirements repository is filled with
countermeasures taken from Methodology for Information Systems Risk Anal-
ysis and Management (MAGERIT) that were translated into security require-
ments. Mellado et al. [73] propose storing and reusing elements from Common
Criteria. Dikanski and Abeck [16] propose the creation of reusable SR analysis
templates (SecRAT) in order to develop and use a knowledge base, offering
various pieces of relevant information such as security standards, technologies,
security models, principles and policies, which can be reused for SRE.
10 i.e., a textual template for requirements specification that is based on predefined
patterns aimed at reducing ambiguity and ensuring consistency regarding the
expression of requirements [94]
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2.5.4 Approaches incorporating Trust Assumptions
Missing consideration or documentation of (trust) assumptions is a challenge
in SRE. Grandison and Sloman state that there is a need for a more formalized
approach to trust establishment, evaluation, and analysis in order to support
trust management [30]. “If developers overestimate or misjudge the trustwor-
thiness of other components in the system, the deployment environment, or
peering organizations, then the underlying security architecture may be inad-
equate” [131]. Haley and colleagues did a lot of research work on the relation
between trust assumptions and SRs [33]. In [34], they present an approach
to use trust assumptions for reasoning about security requirements by using
problem frames [53] and threat descriptions [35].
2.5.5 State of the Practice concerning SRE Methods
To identify and analyze the threat, attacker, and misuse perspective, various
methods exist on the market, such as Microsoft’s STRIDE [123], Abuse Cases
[64], and many others (for details, see section 2.5). However, most of these
methods require security knowledge and method-specific know-how. In the
literature on SRE, it is often stated that the application of SRE methods
and techniques in projects and the maturity of SR specifications are mostly
poor (e.g., [96, 133]). Of the various methods developed for SRE just a small
number have been used in practice to date [96].
2.6 SRE Processes and Frameworks
The practical use of SRE processes, frameworks, and methods is considered
to be poor in most cases. Security is often integrated into the development
life-cycle too late, or not at all [18, 29, 77]. This typically leads to security
being insufficiently considered or not being considered at all in software and
system development projects. Another problem is that SRE can only very
rarely be done completely up-front before the design phase starts. “Most of
the work for traditional requirements engineering fails to explicitly consider se-
curity” [15]. Wilander and Gustavsson conclude in their field study on security
requirements engineering [133] that “current practice in security requirements
is poor”. Salini et al. [96] also arrive at the same conclusion. Mead states in [68]
that “when SRs are considered at all during the system life-cycle, they tend
to be general lists of security features such as password protection, firewalls,
virus detection tools, and the like”. Although numerous publications state that
SRE is important, only little concrete and specific advice is provided that can
be used immediately in projects [129]. SRE approaches are mainly tested on a
small scale, requiring broader external validation to demonstrate their effec-
tiveness and usefulness for the development of security solutions [18]. There is
a demand among security practitioners that SRE methods must be primarily
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understandable and usable, besides being “formally pleasing or academically
correct” [129].
To incorporate the particularities of SRE, the following process models
have been elaborated:
2.6.1 Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE)
Probably the best-known process framework for security requirements engi-
neering is the SQUARE methodology [70] developed by Nancy Mead et al.
which is designed to support the elicitation and prioritization of SRs in soft-
ware development projects.
(a) Main concept / idea:
• Proposal of a generic process to be followed when performing SRE
• Provision of additional details as well as information on input, helpful
techniques, participants, and output for each process step
(b) Structure elements / model:
• n.a.
(c) Reuse aspect:
• n.a.
(d) Considered standards / frameworks:
• n.a.
(e) Process model / steps:
The proposed process consists of the following nine steps:
a) Agree on definitions
b) Identify security goals
c) Develop artifacts to support security requirements definition
d) Perform risk assessment
e) Select elicitation techniques
f) Elicit security requirements
g) Categorize requirements as to level (system, software, etc.) and whether
they are requirements or other kinds of constraints
h) Prioritize requirements
i) Requirements inspection
2.6.2 Extending XP Practices to Support Security Requirements
Engineering
Gustav Boström et al. developed a seven-step process for security require-
ments engineering that is primarily intended for agile development, particu-
larly concerning eXtreme Programming (XP) practices [6]. The process model
enhances XP user stories in order to include SRs.
• Main concept / idea:
– Process for agile developments to be followed
– Development of abuser stories / threat scenarios
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– Conduction of risk assessments
• Structure elements / model:
– n.a.
• Reuse aspect:
– n.a.
• Considered standards / frameworks:
– n.a.
• Process model / steps:
The proposed process consists of the following seven steps:
1. Identification of security sensitive assets
2. Formulation of abuser stories (threat scenarios)
3. Abuser story risk assessment
4. Abuser story and user story negotiation
5. Definition of security-related user stories
6. Definition of security-related coding standards
7. Abuser story – countermeasure cross-checking
2.6.3 A Reuse-Based Approach to Determining Security
Requirements
Sindre et al. propose a reuse-based approach for application development that
involves identifying security threats with misuse cases and associated SRs
with security use cases [115]. Threats and requirements are abstracted and
incorporated into a repository of generic threats and requirements for later
reuse.
• Main concept / idea:
– Focus on reusing threats and security requirements described in terms
of use cases
– Identification of threats via misuse cases
– Identification of security requirement bundles (specifications) using
security use cases
– Establishment of relationships between threats and requirements bun-
dles
• Structure elements / model:
– Meta-model for repository
• Reuse aspect:
– Reuse of threats
– Reuse of security requirements
– Storing of all reusable elements as generic threats and requirements
in a repository
• Considered standards / frameworks:
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– n.a.11
• Process model / steps:
Process consisting of five steps:
1. Identify critical and/or vulnerable assets
2. Determine security goals for each asset
3. Identify threats to each asset
4. Analyze risk for each threat
5. Determine requirements
2.6.4 Security Requirements Engineering Process (SREP)
Daniel Mellado et al. developed a CC-centered and reuse-based approach
for security requirements engineering [73]. The approach builds on the pro-
cess steps of SQUARE [70]. The components from CC (ISO/IEC 15408) [43]
such as functional requirements, protection profiles, and evaluation assurance
levels are utilized as reusable information to be provided in a Security Re-
sources Repository (SRR). Based on a meta-model (which is an extended
version of the meta-model described in [115]), elements are established us-
ing parameter-based mechanisms (e.g., reusable parametrized templates) and
non-parametrized templates and checklists (e.g., asset checklists). SRs are
elicited by identifying relevant threats in the repository and the related (one
or more) associated cluster(s) of SRs.
• Main concept / idea:
– Integration of CC into a reusable security resources repository
– Reuse of security requirements with UMLSec, expressed as security
use cases or as plaintext with formal specification
– Reuse of threats expressed as misuse cases, threat/attack trees, UMLSec
diagrams
– Concept of assets, threats, requirements, and countermeasures
• Structure elements / model:
Extended meta-model for repository based on [115]
• Reuse aspect:
– Security Resources Repository (SRR)
– Storing of all reusable elements (e.g., security requirements cluster
using CC packages and profiles, threats)
• Considered standards / frameworks:
– CC (ISO/IEC 15408) for security requirements
– Secure Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM)
(ISO/IEC 21827) for security engineering process
Other mentioned security standards with unclear incorporation in the
model:
11 No standards are directly foreseen in the approach since threats are derived from
misuse cases and security requirements from security use cases. However, the
authors mention that external sources could also be incorporated.
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– ISO/IEC 13335
– ISO/IEC 17799
– ISO/IEC 27001
• Process model / steps:
Process steps based on SQUARE [70]
1. Agree on definitions
2. Identify vulnerable and/or critical assets
3. Identify security objectives and dependencies
4. Identify threats and develop artifacts
5. Perfom risk assessment
6. Elicit security requirements
7. Categorize and prioritize requirements
8. Perform requirements inspection
9. Improve repository
2.6.5 SImple REuse of software requiremeNts (SIREN)
An approach proposed by Ambrosio Toval et al. is called SIREN [130], which is
based on a spiral development process model [57] enriched with reuse aspects.
Just like in SREP [73], it foresees the creation of a reusable requirements
repository, but uses requirements specification standards and recommended
practices as basis for the structuring of requirements (called ‘requirements
specification documents hierarchy’) and combines it with MAGERIT [74], the
Spanish public administration risk analysis and management method. A repos-
itory of SRs initially filled with content from MAGERIT is used, which can
be structured according to domains and profiles and, is a concept comparable
to that of SREP.
• Main concept / idea:
– Structuring of security requirements according to standard-based doc-
uments hierarchies.
– Reuse of security requirements taken from MAGERIT.
• Structure elements / model:
– SIREN requirements documents hierarchy
– MAGERIT information system layer shown as potential structure ba-
sis
• Reuse aspect:
– Reusable requirements repository composed of profiles and domains
– Reusable requirements lists taken from MAGERIT
• Considered standards / frameworks:
Requirements specification standards:
– IEEE Std. 830:1998 [39]
– IEEE Std. 1233:1998 [38]
Security standards / frameworks:
– MAGERIT
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• Process model / steps:
Spiral model for RE adapted to SIREN:
1. Elicitation incorporating reuse of requirements
2. Analysis and negotiation
3. Documentation
4. Validation, incl. improvement of repository
3Model for Structuring and Reusing Security
Requirements Sources
In this chapter all parts of the model for structuring and reusing SRSs will
be described. Initially, the categorization of reusable SRSs (corresponding to
contribution 1) will be described in section 3.1. The meta-model and the entity
relationship diagram (i.e., contribution 2) that were developed will be shown
and explained in section 3.2. The approach for instantiating the generic model
will be presented in section 3.3. Finally, relevant views and resulting benefits
of the model will be described in section 3.4.
3.1 Security Requirements Sources
Ideas, like large rivers,
never have just one source.
Willy Ley
To derive a categorization of reusable, security-specific SRSs to be con-
sidered in the model, first the structure and information provided in chapter
2 will be taken and placed into the context of the common security engi-
neering approach (cf. Figure 2.6). The resulting extended security engineering
approach including relevant SRS categories will be described in section 3.1.1.
Furthermore, the perceptions gained from chapter 2 will be combined with the
Twin Peaks model to examine potential SRSs in the context of an iterative
development process, as described in section 3.1.2.
Based on the developed extended security engineering approach and the
SRS view on the Twin Peaks model, the SRSs to be incorporated in the model
will be presented in section 3.1.3, and a definition of SRSs will be given in
section 3.1.4.
3.1.1 Extended Security Engineering Approach
From a security engineering perspective, SRs are derived from threats and
risks as depicted in the security engineering approach (cf. Figure 2.6). How-
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ever, as presented in section 2.4, SRs may not only originate from threats
and risks, but can also be derived from any diagnostic security information
and knowledge and SRE methods that support the analysis of the problem
space. Moreover, raw requirements can also originate from customers and from
the environment, which is referred to as compliance obligations in this thesis.
These compliance obligations impose raw requirements, which need to be an-
alyzed together with diagnostic security information and knowledge sources
and SRE method results before being transferred into well-formed SRs.
The resulting extended security engineering approach is depicted in Figure
3.1, which shows the reusable categories of SRSs as orange boxes.
Fig. 3.1. Extended security engineering approach with SRSs
The approach shows that SRs are not only necessitated by threats and
risks, but also result from weaknesses and vulnerabilities, as well as other raw
requirements.
For the identification of threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities, a differ-
entiation is made between the two SRS categories security information and
knowledge (cf. section 2.4) and results and artifacts from SRE methods (cf.
section 2.5). Compliance obligations, as the third SRS category, impose raw
requirements that need to be incorporated and analyzed together with the
identified threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities when specifying SRs. There
are several other potential SRSs from the environment or from customers;
however, they can only be provided in a reusable form in exceptional cases
(cf. section 2.3).
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3.1.2 SRS View on the Twin Peaks Model
Another view on the development of SRs is related to the iterative develop-
ment of requirements specifications and architectures.
Typically, SRE can only be completed in very exceptional small cases be-
fore the architecture and design phase starts. A ‘big-bang’ approach in which
all security constraints and influences can be considered and specified before-
hand will seldom work in practice (see also [71]), since typically not all con-
straints and influences can be clarified in advance or they may change during
the system’s development. Furthermore, design decisions made on the basis
of the initial set of SRs and trust assumptions may introduce new influences
and constraints such as new or changed threats and weaknesses. This might
in turn result in a demand for additional security analysis and additional or
revised requirements. Thus, SRE activities should not be performed sequen-
tially in a single phase within the development life-cycle. Instead, (security)
RE and architecture design should be interwoven in an incremental approach.
To visualize and explain such an incremental approach for security, the Twin
Peaks model [87] was extended for this work, as shown in Figure 3.2.
Problem Space Solution Space
• Diagnostic 
Security 
Information and 
Knowledge
• Compliance 
Obligations
• Artifacts and 
Results from 
SRE Methods
Security Requirements Security Architecture
• Prescriptive 
Security 
Information and 
Knowledge
• Artifacts and 
Results from 
Architecture 
Reviews
Specification
General
Detailed
Fig. 3.2. SRS view on the twin peaks model
In this approach, SRs and architectural specifications are developed con-
currently after the initial set of SRs has been identified.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the primary SRSs to be considered for the anal-
ysis of the problem space are diagnostic security information and knowledge,
compliance obligations, and artifacts and results from SRE methods, which
are assigned to the SR peak. As primary sources for the solution space, and
thus for the architecture and design of security measures, prescriptive secu-
rity information and knowledge and artifacts and results from architecture
reviews serve as input. As described, both peaks and the respective SRSs are
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intertwined in practice, which demands their incorporation in both peaks or
development phases, and consequently also the identification and documenta-
tion of their relationships. This mutual influence between the problem space
and the solutions space indicates that it is highly desirable to combine diag-
nostic and prescriptive information and knowledge resources for the elicitation
of SRs.
3.1.3 SRS Categories to be Incorporated into the Model
Based on the extended security engineering approach and the SRS view on the
Twin Peaks model, the following four main SRS categories are incorporated
into the model for structuring and reusing SRSs.
• Diagnostic security information and knowledge (cf. section 2.4.1)
• Prescriptive security information and knowledge (cf. section 2.4.2)
• Compliance obligations (cf. section 2.3.3)
• Results and artifacts from SRE methods (cf. section 2.5)
3.1.4 Definition of Security Requirements Sources
In online dictionaries1, the term source is defined as anything from which
something comes into being or is derived or obtained (also referred to as
origin), or something such as a book, statement, person or document, that
supplies information.
In standards for requirements specifications (Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 830 [39], IEEE Std. 1233 [38]), the term
requirements source is not explicitly defined. However, the term requirements
source is used in standards to describe the traceability from a requirement
to the originating source. “Each requirement should be further classified by
a label that indicates the originator. There may be multiple sources that can
all be considered creators of the requirement. It is useful to identify the cre-
ator(s) of each requirement so that if requirements are unclear, conflict, or
need to be modified or deleted, it will be possible to identify the individual(s)
or organization(s) to be consulted” [38]. A requirements specification is trace-
able “if the origin of each of its requirements is clear and if it facilitates the
referencing of each requirement” [39].
For this thesis with its special focus on the reuse of sources, we define the
term Security Requirements Source considering the perceptions gained from
chapter 2, the extended security engineering approach (cf. section 3.1.1), and
the SRS view on the Twin Peaks model (cf. section 3.1.2):
Definition 13. Security Requirements Source: Security Requirements
Sources (SRSs) are the origin from which security requirements come into
being or from which they are derived or obtained. The main categories of
1 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/source, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/source
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reusable SRSs are diagnostic and prescriptive security information and knowl-
edge sources, compliance obligations, and results and artifacts from SRE meth-
ods. SRSs can be provided in different forms such as documents, books, online
repositories, persons, or documented method results.
3.2 Meta-Model and Entity Relationship Diagram
“You never change things
by fighting the existing reality.
To change something, build a new model
that makes the existing model obsolete.”
R. Buckminster Fuller
In this section, the generic model including its components will be pre-
sented, which serves as basis for the instantiation of an organization-specific
SRS repository. An overview and explanation of the model will be provided
in section 3.2.1, followed by the associated entity relationship diagram for the
model in section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Meta-Model
For structuring and reusing SRSs, a generic model was developed, which serves
as a blueprint for the instantiation of an organization-specific SRS repository,
as shown in Figure 3.3. The intention was to develop a structure that is as
stable as possible and in which SRS elements are structured and provided to
development teams for the specification of SRs.
SR scope areas and security topics are the two main structure elements of the
model.
Definition 14. Scope Area: A scope area determines the scope of consider-
ation, the work to be accomplished, the problem space to be analyzed, and the
security topics to be covered when developing SRs.
Examples of scope areas are ‘software and interfaces’, according to the ‘IEEE
Recommended Practice for Software Requirements Specifications’ [39], and
‘system’, according to the ‘IEEE Guide for Developing System Requirements
Specifications’ [38]. If desired, additional scope areas can be added such as the
organizational environment (i.e., operational, personnel and process-related
aspects) or the development environment (i.e., aspects related to the devel-
opment process and environment of a software or system). Alternatively, a
different structure or terminology of the scope areas can also be chosen if the
typical separation into software and system does not fit, e.g., due to specific
domains or use cases.
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Fig. 3.3. Model overview for structuring and reusing SRSs
Definition 15. Security Topic: A security topic aggregates relevant SRS
elements that support the analysis of the topic-related problem space and the
specification of SRs.
An example of a security topic in the scope area ‘software’ is ‘user authenti-
cation’.
Definition 16. SRS element: An SRS element is a single element from an
SRS in scope. An SRS element can be assigned to one or multiple security
topics in different scope areas.
Examples of SRS elements assigned to the security topic ‘user authentica-
tion’ are:
• Diagnostic information and knowledge sources: ‘CWE-287: Improper Au-
thentication’.
• Prescriptive information and knowledge sources: ‘Do authenticate the
identity of a user before performing any operation that depends on the
verified identity of the subject’.
• Compliance obligations: ‘Unambiguous proof of identity by a strong au-
thentication scheme shall be enforced’.
Security topics inherit topic-specific SRS elements from all four SRS categories
as defined in the scope for the model (cf. section 3.1.3), namely diagnostic and
prescriptive information and knowledge sources, results and artifacts from
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SRE methods, as well as raw requirements from compliance obligations. SRS
elements are often in a mutual relationship, as indicated by the puzzle pieces.
More information on the relationships between the SRS elements and SRS
categories in general will be provided in section 3.2.2.
For each security topic, the assigned SRS elements are analyzed and spec-
ified into a set of security topic-specific SRs as part of the overall SR specifi-
cation. In addition, the analyzed SRS elements can also motivate SRs in other
security topics and scope areas, as indicated by the blue dotted arrow.
As an example, ‘shoulder surfing’2 is a threat (i.e., an SRS element in
the model) that is assigned to SRS the category diagnostic information and
knowledge in the security topic ‘user authentication’. Possible requirements
could either specify that a strong authentication scheme shall be enforced (to
avoid the problem of shoulder surfing), that the user-name- and password-
based authentication mechanism shall mask the actual characters while they
are being typed (to reduce the risk of shoulder surfing), or that users should
be trained to be aware of the threat and act accordingly (to reduce the risk of
shoulder surfing). The first two requirements candidates would be assigned to
SRs for user authentication. The latter, however, would need to be assigned
to the operational environment, e.g., to an SR for a security topic such as
‘training and awareness’.
Figure 3.4 presents a model overview with example scope areas, security
topics, and SRS elements from different SRSs assigned to the SRS categories.
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Fig. 3.4. Model example for structuring and reusing SRSs
2 Shoulder surfing is an observation techniques where an attacker is looking over
someone’s shoulder to get sensitive information such as user name and password.
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In addition, the following example gives an impression of potential SRSs
that provide SRS elements to the security topic ‘user authentication’ in the
scope area ‘software’:
• Scope area: Software
• Security topic: User Authentication
• Diagnostic security information and knowledge (provided as reusable in-
formation in the security requirements repository):
– Threats (from threat lists) related to user authentication
– Common authentication weaknesses (e.g., provided in CWE)
• Prescriptive security information and knowledge (provided as reusable
information in the security requirements repository):
– Design pattern for user-name- and password-based authentication
– Design pattern for certificate-based user authentication
– Design principles for user authentication (e.g., user authentication
should be implemented on the server side and not on the client side)
• Compliance obligations:
Raw requirements relevant for User Authentication derived from:
– Company information security policy on ‘password security’
– Company information security policy on ‘secure access to IT systems’
– Data privacy law / data privacy controls
– Customer requirements on user authentication
• Results and artifacts from SRE methods:
– Generic system overview of the software to be developed (including
description of assets and provided functionality)
– Misuse case(s) (e.g., developed along with use cases incorporating user
authentication)
– Relevant user authentication threats and risks identified via a threat
and risk analysis
3.2.2 Entity Relationship Diagram
Figure 3.5 shows the entity relationship diagram of the proposed model. For
the sake of brevity, most of the entity attributes are omitted here since they
need to be customized anyway during the instantiation of the model.
The relationships between the model elements scope area, security topic,
and SRS, as described in section 3.2.1, are depicted in the upper part of the
Entity Relationship (ER) diagram. It shows that one scope area consists of
one to many security topics.
A security topic consists of one to many SRS elements. Each SRS (ele-
ment) has a unique SRS category assigned by an attribute (e.g., compliance
obligation). SRs are needed by one to many SRS elements, or conversely, one
to many SRS elements are used for the specification of an SR. This is how the
traceability from the resulting SRs to the SRS(s) can be ensured.
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Fig. 3.5. SRS model - Entity relationship diagram
The inherited subordinate objects in the lower part of the ER diagram
reflect the different SRS categories and their relationships. The subordinate
objects correspond to the SRS categories, as depicted in Figure 3.3:
• ‘Threat/Weakness/Vuln.’ corresponds to diagnostic information and knowl-
edge sources.
• ‘Principles/Guidelines/Pattern’ corresponds to prescriptive information
and knowledge sources.
• ‘ComplianceObligations’ corresponds to compliance obligations.
• ‘SRE_MethodResult’ corresponds to results and artifacts from SREmeth-
ods.
The relationships between the SRS elements from the different SRS cate-
gories can be summarized as follows:
To do proper SRE, understanding of the problem space (i.e., threats, weak-
nesses, and vulnerabilities) is required to identify and analyze the bad things
that should be prevented in order to specify adequate SRs. This information is
included in diagnostic information and knowledge sources, or can be identified
with SRE methods.
Diagnostic information and knowledge sources have a strong relationship
with prescriptive information and knowledge sources and compliance obliga-
tions since they motivate and provide the problem to be solved by prescriptive
information (cf. section 2.4.4). Moreover, they explain the motivation why
certain controls or raw requirements in security standards exist and allow
examining whether a selected security measure is suitable for satisfying the
raw requirement from the security standard and for mitigating the underlying
security problem. Furthermore, they can provide valuable input to the appli-
cation of SRE methods such as threat and risk analysis methods in order to
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ensure that the most common threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities have
been considered.
Another important relationship exists between prescriptive information
and knowledge sources and compliance obligations. Although mainly address-
ing the solution space, prescriptive information and knowledge can be help-
ful to support the alignment between the problem and the solution space in
which requirements engineers and system architects work concurrently and
iteratively increase the level of detail of the requirements specification and
the architecture design. In doing so, they provide valuable information such
as security principles, design pattern, or control lists, which contribute to the
fulfillment of raw requirements from compliance obligations.
Besides the above-mentioned relationships reflected in the ER diagram,
the following additional relationships exist (note that this list not exhaustive),
which could also be considered in the model, if required.
• There can exist relationships between SRS (elements) of one SRS cat-
egory. For instance, helpful relationships do exist among elements from
different SRSs in the SRS category diagnostic information and knowl-
edge sources, such as the relationships between threats, weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities. Another example from the SRS category prescriptive in-
formation and knowledge is the relationship between security principles
and related security patterns or controls.
• There can exist relationships between SRE methods and prescriptive infor-
mation and knowledge sources, e.g., if checking the integration of certain
security principles for a product or system is desired.
The relationships between the SRS (elements) as depicted in Figure 3.2.2
can be changed or refined if required, e.g., if more fine-grained relations be-
tween different SRSs need to be modeled, or to ensure that the terminology
is in line with the security ontology used in an organization3.
3.3 Model Instantiation Approach
“Out of clutter, find simplicity.
From discord, find harmony.
In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity.”
Albert Einstein
In this section, the prerequisites and the approach for instantiating the
model described in section 3.2 will be presented. Using the generic model pre-
sented in section 3.2, the following steps, inputs, and outputs will be proposed
to instantiate the model and to create the SRS repository, as shown in Figure
3.6.
3 A literature survey of different security requirements ontologies is provided in
[120].
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Fig. 3.6. SRS model instantiation approach
3.3.1 Prerequisites for Model Instantiation
To be able to successfully instantiate the model for a scenario or organization,
the following prerequisites should be fulfilled.
Required Business- and Scenario-specific Decisions
Before the model for structuring and reusing SRSs can be instantiated, it is
important to decide on the fundamental scenario(s) and business as well as
the use cases to be supported by the SRS repository. Moreover, the motivation
and the drivers for security and SRE must be identified and specified before
the instantiation of the model is started. This information is of particular im-
portance since it has significant influence on the structure of the scope areas
and security topics, the terminology used, the SRSs to be incorporated, and
the complexity of and the effort for applying the resulting repository in the
organization.
Important considerations to be regarded are (but are not limited to):
• Intended user groups, organizational units, and application do-
main(s) to be supported: It is important to define the intended user
groups (e.g., software development projects, system integration projects,
entire software and system scope), organizational units (e.g., corporate in-
formation security organization and enterprise IT units, departments de-
veloping products or solutions, entire organizations) and the application
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domains (e.g., enterprise and office IT, automotive, industry, healthcare)
in which the developed SRS repository will be used. This makes it possible
to clearly specify the intended focus and pursue it during the instantiation
of the model. For instance, the required scope areas, security topics, and
SRSs to be incorporated in software development (e.g., a web application)
differ from development projects where system integration, deployment,
and configuration aspects are the primary focus.
• Obligatory SRSs and related terminology to be incorporated: It
makes a difference for the instantiation if mandatory SRSs such as inter-
nal or external compliance obligations need to be incorporated. Where
applicable, it must be decided which of them is the most relevant or im-
portant source to be regarded when determining scope areas and security
topics. An example: if for a company or organizational unit in a particular
domain the primary driver for their security are compliance obligations,
they would be well advised to follow the structure and terminology of the
security standard instead of developing their own proprietary structure of
scope areas and security topics. A prominent example for industrial au-
tomation control systems is IEC 62443, which already provides a structure
and controls for different scopes, e.g., for the system level (i.e., IEC 62443
3-3). If no obligatory SRS(s) exist, one must decide if one of the SRSs
in scope should be the leading one, or if a completely new organization-
specific structure of scope areas and security topics can and should be
developed.
• Security strategy and use cases of a company or organizational
unit: Depending on the desired coverage of security aspects and SRSs to
be incorporated, the security level as well as the protection against poten-
tial attacker types can be influenced. The higher the level of broadness and
detail of the incorporated SRSs becomes, the higher the chance of speci-
fying sufficient and adequate security requirements and, consequently, the
higher the chance of implementing proper security mechanisms. There-
fore, before the start of the instantiation of the SRS repository, tradeoff
decisions need to be made concerning the desired broadness and depth
of the security investigations as well as regarding the resulting effort for
using the SRS repository in projects.
Organizational and Skill-related Prerequisites
Development teams and (S)RE practitioners without security skills and knowl-
edge are caught in the dilemma that they would require security and infor-
mation sources to overcome their lack of security skills and knowledge, but
simultaneously require a certain level of security knowledge and expertise to
identify, classify, compare, correlate, and use security information and knowl-
edge sources to gain benefit from them, as outlined in section 1.2. Since the
instantiated model is intended to overcome this dilemma by providing an
instantiated SRS repository, profound knowledge about relevant SRS and se-
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curity in general is required to successfully create an SRS repository. Besides
security skills and knowledge, further knowledge and capabilities are also re-
quired. Before instantiation the model, it is recommended identifying the fol-
lowing required knowledge and capabilities and the associated example roles
to be involved during the respective steps.
1. Knowledge about relevant compliance obligations, their scope
and content:
a) External compliance obligations such as laws, statutory, regulatory, or
contractual obligations: legal advisor or suitably qualified legal prac-
titioner, compliance officers, quality manager, auditor.
b) Internal compliance obligations such as policies, security control frame-
works: (corporate) information security officer, product and solution
security officer, compliance officers, quality manager, assessor.
2. Business decisions and security strategy: Chief executive officer,
product manager, (corporate) information security officer, product and
solution security officer.
3. Security knowledge and skills: Security expert, information security
adviser.
3.3.2 Instantiation Approach Steps
Four process steps are proposed to be followed for instantiating an organization-
specific SRS repository.
Step 1) Determination of Scope Areas
The first step is to determine which scope areas are in scope for the resulting
SRS repository. To identify the relevant scope areas, people with knowledge
and skills in the area of (internal and external) compliance obligations as well
as representatives from business and security should be involved.
If a standard-compliant selection of scope areas is desired, the typical parti-
tioning of scope areas would be software and interfaces and system, following
the practice recommended by the IEEE software and system requirements
specification standards [38, 39]. Additionally, if operational process require-
ments or development-specific requirements are also to be specified, additional
scope areas such as organizational environment (i.e., operational personnel
and process-related aspects) and development environment (i.e., aspects re-
lated to the development process and environment of a software or system)
should be added.
Schmitt and Liggesmeyer propose in [101] the differentiation of scope areas
into software, physical and technical environment, and organizational environ-
ment. Moreover, if required, a fourth scope area development environment can
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also be added, which addresses all aspects required for developing a product
or solution securely4.
To properly determine the relevant scope areas as the first structur-
ing layer, following inputs regarding business- and scenario-specific decisions
should be considered, which are the prerequisites for step 1 (cf. section 3.3.1).
• Scenario / Business to be supported
• Use cases to be supported
• Motivation and drivers for security and SRE
The output of step 1 is the resulting scope area structure, which determines
the scope of consideration, the work to be accomplished, the problem space
to be analyzed, and the security topics to be covered when developing SRs.
Step 2) Determination of Security Topics per Scope Area
To determine a suitable structure of security topics for scope areas in the
scenario, the following approach is recommended. Knowledgeable persons re-
garding internal and external compliance obligations should be involved, cf.
section 3.3.1.
(a) Development of a generic structure blueprint: First, a set of widely
accepted IT and information security knowledge sources is chosen that is
relevant for the organization for which the SRS repository is to be instan-
tiated. These standards do not necessarily need to be added as SRSs; how-
ever, they serve as good practice regarding terminology and structure in
the respective domain. It is recommended focusing primarily on prescrip-
tive information and knowledge sources, as well as compliance obligations
since they already provide a consistent and ‘security-topic-like’ structure.
Example standards for enterprise/information IT security are [48,83] and
for product and solution security [36].
The identified standards are analyzed concerning their structure and the
incorporated security aspects, and are mapped to the determined scope
areas (as specified in step 1). This allows identification of common and
recurring terminologies for security topics that fit the particular organi-
zation and application domain. The resulting structure serves as a first
draft structure of security topics for each scope area, which can be used
for the mapping of the SRSs in the scope.
(b) Development of a scenario-specific structure: In the second sub-
step, the elements of the relevant SRSs in scope are coarsely mapped to
the draft structure of the security topics as developed in sub-step (a). If
an element does not fit into the existing structure of the security topics,
it is noted down separately for later analysis. Elements that cannot be
assigned uniquely to a single security topic, e.g. because of their generic
4 In contrast to the development of secure products and solutions.
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nature, are assigned multiple times. In this way, a structure of security
topics can be derived for each scope area.
(c) Troubleshooting: In the third sub-step, the SRS elements that did not
fit into the existing structure (from sub-step (b)) are analyzed once again,
which results either in a reorganized structure or the creation of additional
security topics.
(d) Quality assurance: In order to create a consistent and acceptable (draft)
structure of security topics for each scope area, several iterations of revi-
sions should be performed.
The output of step 2 is a relatively stable organization-specific SRS repos-
itory structure consisting of scope areas and security topics, as depicted in
Figure 3.7.
Scope Area 1 Scope Area 2 Scope Area 3
Determination of
scope areas
Determination of 
security topics per 
scope area
1
2
• Security topic 1
• Security topic 2
• Security topic 3
• Security topic 4
• Security topic 5
• Security topic 6
• Security topic 7
• Security topic 8
• Security topic 9
• Security topic 10
• Security topic 11
• Security topic 12
• Security topic 13
• Security topic 14
• Security topic 15
• Security topic 16
• Security topic 17
• Security topic 18
• Security topic 19
• Security topic 20
• Security topic 21
Fig. 3.7. Structure of scope areas and security topics
Step 3) Assignment of SRS Elements to Security Topics
In the third step of the instantiation approach, all elements from all SRSs in
scope are mapped and assigned to the SRS repository structure developed in
step 2. Please note that in practice, steps 2b-c and step 3 may be parallelized
to a certain degree, particularly if the number of SRS elements in scope is
relatively low.
For the mapping and assignment, a structured walk-through is performed
for each SRS, where each single SRS element is assigned to the security topics
in the respective scope areas. Multiple assignments of SRS elements to security
topics are possible. In general, the more generic an SRS element, the higher
the likelihood of multiple assignments. SRS elements that are overly generic
and thus would need to be mapped to almost every security topic can either
be left out or should at least be marked. Figure 3.8 shows the basic idea of
the assignment of SRS elements to security topics, represented by the black
dotted arrows.
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Fig. 3.8. Assignment of SRS elements to security topics
In the following an example of a mapping of SRS elements to security
topics will be given to make this process step easier to understand.5
Example - Mapping of an SRS element from a diagnostic security information
and knowledge source. Figure 3.9 shows an example of the assignment of an
SRS element from the SRS Common Weaknesses Enumeration to an example
structure of scope areas and security topics.
SRS Content Assigned Scope Areas and Security Topics
Weakness ID Weakness 
Topic
Description Software System in Technical 
Environment
System in Operational 
Environment
CWE-759: Use 
of a One-Way 
Hash without a 
Salt
Insecure 
Password 
Storage
The software uses a one-way 
cryptographic hash against an 
input that should not be 
reversible such as a password, 
but the software does not also 
use a salt as a part of the input.
# User authentication
# SW cryptography 
and key 
management
# Access control
# System data at rest
Fig. 3.9. Assignment of CWE element to scope areas and security topics
5 For the example we assume that the scope areas and security topics mentioned
in the example were identified in steps 1 and 2. However, please note that these
scope areas and security topics do not necessarily have to be identical in other
organization-specific SRS repositories. The evaluation result of a larger set of
SRSs at Siemens AG is presented in chapter 4
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For the example we use the SRS element ‘CWE-759: Use of One-Way Hash
without salt’ from SRS [127].
This SRS element would be assigned to the three scope areas as proposed
in [101] and the first example security topics due to the following rationale:
• Software: Security topics user authentication and SW cryptography and
key management.
Rationale: The use of a one-way hash without salt is a weakness, which
primarily belongs to the security topic user authentication. Since the weak-
ness is introduced by a weakness in a hashing algorithm, it is furthermore
assigned to the security topic SW cryptography and key management.
• System in technical environment: Security topics access control and system
data at rest.
Rationale: Hashed passwords are stored somewhere at the system-level,
e.g., in files of the operating system or somewhere in the database. There-
fore, this weakness is also related to the security topics access control and
system data at rest since passwords need to be secured against unautho-
rized access and security of data at rest (in this case passwords) must be
ensured.
• System in operational environment: In this scope area, no relevant security
topics are assigned for the example since the implementation of secure
password storage via salted hashes can only be implemented in the scope
areas software and system in its technical environment. Please note that
if the example weakness would have been different, e.g., ‘creation of weak
passwords’, then in this scope area a security topic such as awareness and
training would also be of interest.
As the example indicates, each SRS element needs to be read, understood,
and interpreted before it can be assigned to the structure of the security topics
in the various scope areas. Therefore, it is inevitable that for the third process
step, people with profound security knowledge and skills must be involved.
Step 4) Establishing the Relationships between SRS Elements
Once a suitable structure of scope areas and security topics has been cre-
ated and the respective SRS elements have been assigned to security topics,
the relationships between the various SRS elements must be identified and
documented, following the generic relationship model as depicted in Figure
3.5.
In practice, this means that for each element from the SRS it needs to be
analyzed and documented to which other SRS element a relationship exists. In
Figure 3.10 some example relationships between SRS elements are illustrated
by green arrows.
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Fig. 3.10. Establishing relationships between SRS elements
Example - Relationships between an element from diagnostic information and
knowledge and other SRS elements. For the threat ‘Eavesdropping’, all rela-
tionships to other relevant SRS elements in scope are documented, such as
‘Encryption of data during transport or logical and/or physical separation in a
dedicated network’ (which is an element from a prescriptive information and
knowledge source, supporting the mitigation of the threat) and ‘Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) data transferred over networks shall be pro-
tected against unauthorized disclosure and access’ (which is an affected raw
requirement from a compliance obligation). Furthermore, helpful relationships
between different diagnostic SRS elements can also be documented, e.g., to
concretize the generic threat with weaknesses from CWE such as ‘CWE-327:
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm’. This allows providing all
related weaknesses and vulnerabilities related to a particular threat in order
to enhance the understanding of the problems to be solved.
Just as for step 3, people with profound security knowledge and skills
must be involved to provide the understanding of the various SRS elements
and their relationships.
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3.4 Model Views and Benefits
“I’m constantly asking for alternative views
on most things that come to me.”
Paul Wolfowitz
An instantiated SRS repository provides all relevant information to under-
stand and analyze the security problem space and to specify security require-
ments. Scope areas and security topics, and the assigned relationships from
SRS elements to security topics and between the various SRS elements, pro-
vide the necessary basis; however, their usability and efficiency highly depend
on their automated analyzability. The usability and efficiency of an instanti-
ated SRS repository can be highly increased by providing SRE practitioners
with useful automated views, just like in any database system. The following
four views are foreseen for the efficient use of an instantiated SRS repository.
The views are ordered from generic to concrete.6
3.4.1 Scope Area View
The first view shows the structure of the scope areas and the assigned security
topics. Although this view is the most generic and trivial one, it is mentioned
here since it provides the problem space to be analyzed and the security topics
to be covered when developing security requirements in a concrete project. For
instance, if a distinction between software and system is made for the scope
areas, the relevant scope and the relevant security aspects to consider for
a software project are provided via the scope area software and all security
topics assigned to this scope area. Therefore, this view is not only important
for SRE practitioners but also for product or project managers and quality
officers since all relevant security topics to be covered in a project are shown.
3.4.2 Security Topic View
The security topic view shows all SRS elements that are assigned to a partic-
ular security topic. This view therefore queries for all SRS elements assigned
during the instantiation approach in step 3 (cf. section 3.3.2).
For instance, the security topic view on user authentication in the scope
area software provides all SRS elements from all SRSs in scope assigned to
this topic. The result of the query can be filtered and sorted according to
different criteria.
As filter criteria, a user of the SRS repository can only display elements
from particular SRSs or SRS categories. As an example, only SRS elements
from the SRS within a specific SRS category can be shown for a security topic,
6 In an operational tool, these queries should be automated, e.g., by using views in
a database system.
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e.g., to display only relevant SRS elements related to the security topic user
authentication that originate from the SRS category compliance obligations.
Moreover, a filter could also be set on one specific SRS, or specific SRSs from
different SRS categories.
The sorting of the query result can provide all relevant SRS elements,
structured first according to their SRS category and second according to their
SRS.
Several benefits arise from this view for practitioners, as it helps to:
• Understand the problem space for a security topic and the motivation
for utilizing related prescriptive information and knowledge as well as
compliance obligations.
• Use the information about typical threats and weaknesses during the ap-
plication of SRE methods.
• Consider existing recommendations and best practices when analyzing a
security topic and aligning it with software or system (security) architects’
viewpoints.
• Identify identical or similar raw requirements from different compliance
obligations to increase the efficiency for fulfilling these requirements.
• Incorporate results from previous applications of SRE methods to avoid
the recurrence of security problems.
3.4.3 SRS Element View
With the third view, all SRS elements with relationships to a single SRS
element are shown. For instance, for a raw requirement from a compliance
obligation, all related diagnostic and prescriptive information and knowledge
sources as well as results from SRS methods are provided, which help to un-
derstand and satisfy the compliance obligation.
This leads to the following benefits:
• Possibility to view all related diagnostic information and knowledge
sources as well as compliance obligations for a prescriptive SRS element.
This supports the mitigation of threats, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities
and, moreover, helps to properly address raw requirements stemming from
compliance obligations.
• Possibility to view all related diagnostic and prescriptive information and
knowledge sources that help to analyze and address a raw requirement or
control from a compliance obligation.
• Possibility to view which diagnostic information and knowledge sources
are incorporated into an SRE method result (e.g., an identified weakness
from a threat and risk analysis).
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3.4.4 SRS Coverage Views
As presented in section 3.2.2, a relationship between an SR and the originating
SRS elements exists in order to ensure traceability. In practice, this means
that every time an SR is specified, the incorporated SRS elements that led
to the specification of the SR need to be documented.7 For instance, it must
be documented which raw requirements stem from compliance obligations or
which threats are addressed by the specified requirements.
Through this creation of relationships between SRs and incorporated SRS
elements, a view showing the coverage of SRSs can be created. For instance,
for a threat list (as an example of a diagnostic information and knowledge
source) it can be checked if all threats in the list (i.e., all SRS elements) are
incorporated into at least one of the specified SRs. Another example would be
an external control list (as an example of a compliance obligation), for which
it can be checked if at least all raw requirements have been considered in the
resulting set of requirements and, if not, which are still open. Please note that
for all SRSs and their elements, it can only be checked if they were considered
in the final set of requirements. However, if one also wants to check if the SRS
elements are addressed completely (e.g., if a threat is addressed completely
or if a raw requirement is covered entirely by the resulting set of SRs), an
additional metric for measuring the completeness or maturity would have to
be incorporated.
The following benefits result from this view:
• Possibility to view which elements of SRS in scope are already incorpo-
rated into the specified set of SRs.
• Possibility to view for each specified SR which SRS elements are incorpo-
rated (e.g., which threats are addressed, which design pattern is related to
the requirement, which compliance obligation is satisfied by the require-
ment).
7 This documentation of incorporated SRS elements per SR should be supported
with a proper tool support.

4Evaluation
“Don’t fear failure so much that you refuse to try new things.
The saddest summary of a life contains three descriptions:
could have, might have, and should have.”
Louis E. Boone
In this section, the evaluation of the theoretic parts of this PhD thesis will
be described (cf. sections 3.1-3.4).
After presenting the evaluation scenario and the SRSs in scope, the instan-
tiated SRS repository and the resulting views and benefits will be presented.
Representative examples demonstrating the applicability of the model and the
instantiation approach in a real-world scenario at Siemens AG will be shown
and empirical perceptions and challenges will be described.1
4.1 Tool Support for the Evaluation
The evaluation was done completely using Microsoft Excel R© and its built-in
functionality, particularly the customizable filter mechanisms. All SRSs were
transferred from their original formats into spreadsheets in order to harmonize
their layout and formatting.2 All examples and views shown in this thesis were
composed using custom filters for each spreadsheet.
For commercialized or professional use of the model and an instantiated
SRS repository during the course of daily business, a more automated and
user-friendly tool, preferably based on a database and convenient Graphical
User Interface (GUI) is recommended, offering features such as interfaces for
1 Due to company-internal information handling reasons and binding non-disclosure
agreements, not all SRSs and the resulting instantiated SRS repository will be
shown in detail.
2 The original formats of the SRSs are .pfd [49, 100, 110, 114], html/website [127],
.xls [113], .doc [112].
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data upload and predefined queries and views for using the repository. How-
ever, to show the applicability and the results of the proposed model and
instantiation approach, Microsoft Excel R© is the tool preferred by the author,
particularly due to many assignments, enhancements, and adaptations done
during the evaluation.
4.2 Evaluation Scope and Scenario
The following industrial scenario was used to evaluate the applicability of the
proposed model and the instantiation approach.
4.2.1 Business- and Scenario-specific Decisions for the SRS
Repository to be Instantiated
The evaluation focuses on combining various SRSs from three different Siemens
corporate departments, namely Product and Solution Security (PSS), Corporate
Information Security (ISEC), and Healthcare Data Protection (HDP). The
SRSs of these departments are enhanced with additional external diagnostic
and prescriptive information and knowledge sources. Prior to the evaluation,
none of the SRSs had been aligned or correlated with each other.
The goal of the instantiation was to develop a preferably universal struc-
ture of scope areas and security topics, resulting in a Siemens-specific SRS
repository that can be used for the elicitation of SRs by PSS and ISEC prac-
titioners.
The aim was to make it possible to identify relevant SRS elements for
one or several of the incorporated SRSs (particularly for the compliance obli-
gations) together with additional helpful information for understanding the
problem space underlying each SRS. For this reason, not only the SRSs for
a single company department, but also the SRSs from all different company
departments and the additional security SRSs were to be correlated with each
other. The resulting structure and terminology needed to be universal enough
to fit the different SRSs and purposes of the different organizational depart-
ments. This means that the instantiated model is not structured according
to a particular compliance obligation nor is it specifically customized for a
certain target group such as software or system architects.
Differentiation between typical aspects related to software, systems, and
additional non-technical and organizational topics was to be ensured. From
an organizational perspective, at least the following use cases were to be sup-
ported, which are an integral part of IT security, product management, and
product life-cycle management processes:
• Provision of relevant SRSs to be considered and proof of compliance, when
developing ISEC security concepts for an application or a complete IT sys-
tem (consisting of an application and infrastructure). At least compliance
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with SRSs from the ISEC department needs to be ensured. Optionally,
additional SRSs shall be extendable.
• Provision of relevant SRSs to be regarded when developing products or
solutions (i.e., in the PSS department). The SRSs are intended to be used
during the design of security architectures and the conduction of threat
and risk analysis workshops.
• Provision of SRSs for which HDP is responsible, enhanced with additional
guidance from other SRSs. The goal was not to ensure compliance with
data privacy laws. However, the provided SRSs are intended to support the
development of a security concept that can be used as part of a procedure
index (according to BDSG).
SRS elements that are related to the security life-cycle (e.g., what the devel-
opment environment should look like, or which kind of security tests should
be conducted at which point in time in the life-cycle) were left out, since they
are not relevant for the presented scenarios.
4.2.2 Considered Security Requirements Sources
To achieve a high significance and broadness of the evaluation, the follow-
ing SRSs from the three Siemens AG departments ISEC, PSS, and HDP
were selected and extended with additional, non-company SRSs from exter-
nal repositories. In total, over 500 elements from eight different SRSs had
to be structured, covering at least one representative per SRS category, as
depicted in Table 4.1.
SRS Category Security Requirements Source
Diagnostic Information
and Knowledge Sources
PSS threat and risk analysis questionnaire [110]
Selected weaknesses from CWE [127]
Deliberate threats from ISO/IEC 27005 [49]
Prescriptive Information
and Knowledge Sources
PSS secure architecture guidelines [100]
ISEC secure software development policy [114]
Compliance Obligations ISEC information security control framework [113]HDP data privacy controls [112]
SRE Method Results Results from selected threat and risk analysis workshops
Table 4.1. SRS sources in the evaluation scenario
Due to this broad basis of SRSs, different technical, physical, and orga-
nizational security aspects in different scope areas had to be structured and
their relationships had to be established. The following examples give an im-
pression of SRS elements in order to illustrate the content of the various SRSs.
To facilitate comparability, all examples were selected from the security topic
‘authentication’.
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Example Diagnostic Information and Knowledge Sources
Tables 4.2 - 4.4 show some example SRS elements from the incorporated
diagnostic information and knowledge sources.
The purpose of the PSS threat and risk analysis questionnaire is to support
threat and risk analysis workshop teams in the identification of common IT
security weaknesses and corresponding threats.
PSS threat and risk analysis questionnaire
ID Threat
Title
Threat Question (to be asked during Threat and Risk 
Analysis)
Threat Explanation
SW-1 Missing
User 
Authenti-
cation
Is it ensured that a successful authentication (not only 
identification) against the application is required / mandatory 
before
−
any non-public action is executed on behalf of a user,
−
any non-public data is presented to a user or to the user’s 
client, or
−
access to any non-public subcomponent is granted?
An adversary might be able to bypass user authentication using 
access paths that are not covered by user authentication 
mechanisms. The adversary might learn about data they are not 
authorized to see. Thus, an adversary might have unauthorized 
access to data or might be able to perform unauthorized actions. 
Depending on the concrete scenario, the impact might be 
disastrous.
SW-2 Client-
Side User 
Authenti-
cation
Does your software provide robust and secure server-side (not 
client-side) authentication mechanisms?
Unauthorized Access to Resources:
An adversary can usually very easily manipulate the client code to 
circumvent client-side checks. This might be done by e.g. reverse 
engineering or modifying the code at runtime using a debugger. A 
client, as a matter of fact, has to be deemed insecure as it is very 
hard to prevent manipulation of code an adversary has access to. 
Thus, final authentication decisions must never be taken on the 
client-side, but always on the server-side.
… … … …
Table 4.2. SRS 1 – PSS threat and risk analysis questionnaire [110]
The selected weaknesses from CWE contain example entries from the
community-developed CWE online dictionary. The intention of the dictionary
is to provide “a unified, measurable set of software weaknesses” and to enable
a “better understanding and management of software weaknesses related to
architecture and design” [127].
Selected weaknesses from CWE
ID Weakness Title Description Summary
CWE-759 Use of a One-Way Hash without a 
Salt
The software uses a one-way cryptographic hash against an input that should not be reversible, such as 
a password, but the software does not also use a salt as part of the input.
CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials Hard-coded credentials typically create a significant hole that allows an attacker to bypass the 
authentication that has been configured by the software administrator. This hole might be difficult for the 
system administrator to detect. Even if detected, it can be difficult to fix, so the administrator may be 
forced into disabling the product entirely. 
… … …
Table 4.3. SRS 2 - Selected weaknesses from CWE [127]
A list of deliberate threats was taken from the international standard for
information security risk management ISO/IEC 27005:2011. The incorporated
threats used as SRS elements during the evaluation are deliberate threats from
the (informative) threat list provided in annex c.3
3 Accidental and environmental (i.e. natural) threats were left out since they are
primarily relevant for information security, but not for IT security, which is the
primary focus of this PhD thesis.
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Deliberate threats from ISO/IEC 27005
ID (self-defined, not from SRS) Threat Type Threat
ISO-37 Unauthorised actions Corruption of data 
ISO-38 Unauthorised actions Illegal processing of data
… … …
Table 4.4. SRS 3 - Deliberate threats from ISO/IEC 27005 [49]
Example Prescriptive Information and Knowledge Sources
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show some example SRS elements from the incorporated
prescriptive information and knowledge sources.
The purpose of the PSS secure architecture guideline is to “provide the
reader with guidance on architectural security design considerations, required
for the secure design of software/components, systems and solutions” [100].
PSS secure architecture guidelines
ID Guideline Category Guideline Topic
A-UA-002-D001 Default User Authentication Functionalities Do provide mechanism to set the initial user passwords for each user to a random value, 
fulfilling the defined password quality criteria.
A-UA-002-D002 Default User Authentication Functionalities Do enforce a mechanism to randomly generate initial authentication secrets, if the initial 
authentication secrets are created before a user can do so. Never use default 
passwords.
A-UA-002-D003 Default User Authentication Functionalities Do only use well-proven and secure algorithms for automatic password generation to 
avoid predictable sequences.
… … …
Table 4.5. SRS 4 - PSS secure architecture guidelines [100]
The ISEC secure software development policy provides rules and principles
with a special focus on the development of secure software.
ISEC secure software development policy
ID Guideline Topic
SSD-15 Every access to non-public interfaces by users or systems must be appropriately authenticated. (Note: Non-public interfaces can be web 
applications, web services, backend system connections, database connections and administrative interfaces.)
SSD-16 Use dedicated framework/library functions for password fields in user interfaces, for example password fields that mask the actual characters 
and that prevent content caching and auto-completion.
SSD-18 After a failed authentication attempt, do not report the exact cause of the failure: whether the user was unknown or whether the user existed 
but the password was incorrect.
… …
Table 4.6. SRS 5 - ISEC secure software development policy [114]
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Example Compliance Obligations
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show some example SRS elements from the incorporated
compliance obligations.
The ISEC information security control framework prescribes a mandatory
list of protection requirements to be followed when developing and imple-
menting applications or infrastructures for Siemens AG. It is a list of raw
requirements derived on the basis of the classification of the processed and
stored information and the resulting security level.
ISEC information security control framework
ID Security Level 1 (Low) Security Level 2 (Medium) Security Level 3 (High)
402002-02 Single-factor authentication (i.e. something 
you know, something you have or something 
you are) following good security practices.
Unambiguous proof of identity by a strong 
authentication scheme (higher level of 
assurance than single-factor authentication; 
according to current state of technology)
Non-repudiable proof of identity by a strong 
authentication scheme through two-/ multi-
factor authentication (according to current 
state of technology)
… … … …
Table 4.7. SRS 6 - ISEC information security control framework [113]
The HDP data privacy controls are Siemens-specific data privacy require-
ments that need to be followed in order to achieve compliance with data
privacy laws.
HDP data privacy controls
ID Control General Guidance
P8 Every access to 
network and user 
interfaces shall be 
authenticated.
Authentication is the prerequisite for preventing unauthorized access or disclosure of PII. This applies to interactive 
access by users as well as to access by other systems. 
After successful authentication the authorization of the user or system has to be checked to determine if access is 
allowed. 
P9 Password-based 
authentication shall 
be state-of-the-art.
Today, state-of-the-art password based user authentication comprises the following aspects. Each aspect shall be 
supported.
a) The user shall be able to change his password. 
b) A configurable password policy, allowing to enforce 
- password changes at regular intervals, 
- complex passwords with sufficient length, 
- policy changeable by administration role only
c) Mechanisms to prevent password guessing, e.g. enforcing delays after failed authentication requests
d) The authentication protocol itself shall be secured, i.e. passwords shall not be transferred in plaintext and 
secured against replay. Use of SSL/TLS with server-authentication is considered as state-of-the-art for protection of 
passwords during transmission.
e) Passwords shall be stored securely within the system, i.e. restrictive access rights, storage as salted hash where 
possible.
… … …
Table 4.8. SRS 7 - HDP data privacy controls [112]
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Results from selected PSS threat and risk analysis workshops
‘Results from selected threat and risk analysis workshops’ are real findings
from Threat and Risk Analysis (TRA) workshops performed at Siemens AG.
Due to the strictly confidential content of threat and risk analysis workshop
results, this particular SRS is not available for anybody except for the TRA
team and the product owner. Therefore, this SRS is not handled like the other
SRSs or a normal reference in this thesis. Since TRA workshop results reveal
security problems to avoid, such as threats and weaknesses (cf. section 3.1.3),
they can be treated similar to diagnostic information and knowledge sources
and therefore not shown explicitly in the following evaluation. A neutralized
example of a TRA workshop is presented in Table 4.9, based on the Siemens
TRA method [105]4.
Results from selected threat and risk analysis workshops
TRA Workshop Reference Threat Risk
TRA workshop for SW product
<anonymized>, <date>.
Use of hard-coded password to 
encrypt data in transit between 
component <anonymized> and 
<anonymized>. If revealed, this 
enables an attacker to gain 
unauthorized access to 
information.
• Exposure rating (likelihood whether an attack may be attempted): The software can 
be reached via the internet. -> Exposure rating: High
• Exploitability rating (likelihood whether an attempted attack is likely to succeed): 
Hard-coded passwords might easily be found out using e.g., available 
documentation, reverse engineering, or debugging. Hard-coded passwords can’t 
be changed easily and therefore exploited over a long period of time by 
adversaries.to grain unauthorized access to information and services. -> 
Exploitability rating: High
• Impact: If hard-coded passwords are revealed and available on the internet, 
customers don’t buy the product any more which would lead to critical loss of 
reputation, customers and market share. -> Impact Rating: Critical
• Overall risk rating: Major risk (risk has to be treated with highest priority in terms of 
definition and implementation of countermeasures or accepted by senior 
management).
… …
Table 4.9. Results from selected threat and risk analysis workshops
4.3 Instantiated Model
To apply the instantiation approach presented in section 3.3.2 on the SRSs
as defined in the evaluation scenario and scope (cf. section 4.2), the following
inputs were used and outputs were created using the defined instantiation
approach steps. Further information on perceptions and challenges encoun-
tered are not explained here for each instantiation step, but will rather be
summarized in section 4.5.
4 The detailed analysis result by means of likelihood rating (based on the ex-
ploitability and exposure rating of the weakness) and the resulting impact (based
on several impact scenarios) for the concrete threat are left out since the ratings
are not relevant for understanding the example and require the entire method to
be fully understood.
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4.3.1 Step 1) Determine Scope Areas
As a prerequisite for the development of an organization-specific SRS reposi-
tory, the evaluation scope and scenario described in section 4.2 were used to
determine the relevant scope areas as the first structuring layer (cf. section
3.3.1).
The output of step 1 is the scope area structure, which determines the
scope of consideration, the work to be accomplished, the problem space to
be analyzed, and the security topics to be covered when analyzing the prob-
lem space and developing SRs. To ensure the differentiation between typical
aspects related to software, systems, and additional non-technical and or-
ganizational topics, the structure of scope areas proposed by Schmitt and
Liggesmeyer in [101] was used.
For the proposed model, a distinction was made between the three scope
areas software, system in technical environment, and system in organizational
environment, as depicted in Figure 4.15. These three scope areas ensure that
the model can be used for the software, the system level, as well as aspects
in the operational environment. Thus, it is ensured that scope areas can be
mapped to typical security aspects and responsibilities in classical enterprise
IT and also to typical product and solution business in organizations. Another
advantage is that, if desired, organizational and process-related aspects can be
treated separately from technical and physical aspects, which are often mixed
up in security standards.
• Software: The heart of the model is the software itself. Typical security
topics (sometimes also referred to as security quality factors [22]) are au-
thentication, authorization, session management, data at rest security, or
data in transit security. The typical outcome of the security requirements
engineering phase for this scope area is a set of security requirements and
trust assumptions, which are typically part of a software requirements
specification document. Software is deployed on a system in its technical
environment6.
• System in Technical Environment: A system in its technical envi-
ronment consists of relevant physical and technical conditions and objects
that are relevant for the software. Examples of objects within the physical
and technical environment are servers, the areas, buildings, and rooms
where relevant system components are located, client devices, network(s),
other neighboring systems or services relevant for the software. Further-
more, other security mechanisms and services protecting the infrastructure
5 The potential fourth scope area ‘development environment’, which addresses all
SDLC aspects required for the secure development of products, systems, and
solutions are left out since SDLC aspects are beyond the scope of this evaluation
(cf. section 4.2.2).
6 Environment (similar to the definition of the term ‘environment’ in [85]) refers
to procedures, conditions, and objects affecting the development, operation, and
maintenance of a system.
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are in scope. Typical security topics related to the system in its technical
environment are, e.g., physical security, network security, secure software
configuration, secure system configuration and hardening, malware pro-
tection.
• System in Organizational Environment: An organizational environ-
ment includes relevant organizational aspects as well as processes and
procedures required to securely set up, operate, maintain, and use the
software and the system in its technical environment. Examples of organi-
zational aspects are, e.g., the issuance of mandatory security policies and
guidelines, the set-up of a security organization with clearly defined roles
and responsibilities, and the conduction of security training and aware-
ness activities for employees and third-party personnel. Examples of op-
erational, security-related processes and procedures include user manage-
ment, privilege management, key management, vulnerability and patch
management, incident management, and many more.
Software System in Technical Environment
System in Operational 
Environment
Determination of 
scope areas
1
• Security topic 1
• Security topic 2
• Security topic 3
• Security topic 4
• Security topic 5
• Security topic 6
• Security topic 7
• Security topic 8
• Security topic 9
• Security topic 10
• Security topic 11
• Security topic 12
• Security topic 13
• Security topic 14
• Security topic 15
• Security topic 16
• Security topic 17
• Security topic 18
• Security topic 19
• Security topic 20
• Security topic 21
Fig. 4.1. Evaluation - Step 1: Determination of scope areas
4.3.2 Step 2) Determine Security Topics per Scope Area
To figure out a suitable structure of security topics for the determined scope
areas in the evaluation scenario, the approach described in section 3.3.2 was
applied.
(a) Development of a generic structure blueprint: First, a set of widely
accepted IT and information security knowledge sources [47, 48, 83] was
chosen, together with the structure (particularly the table of contents per
SRS) of the incorporated SRSs in the evaluation scope. Their structure
and incorporated SRS elements were analyzed and mapped to the three
above-mentioned scope areas. This enabled the identification of common
and recurring terminologies for security topics. The resulting structure of
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security elements for each scope area served as a draft structure, which
formed the basis for the detailed assignment of the SRS elements.
(b) Development of a scenario-specific structure: In the second sub-
step, the SRS elements of the SRSs in the evaluation scenario were parsed.
The primary focus was on prescriptive information and knowledge sources
as well as on compliance obligations, since they mostly already provide a
consistent and ‘security-topic-like’ structure. The SRSs were mapped and
assigned to the structure as developed in sub-step (a). Elements that were
not in the scope of the evaluation were discarded prior to the mapping.
Most of the SRS elements could be assigned directly to the structure of
the security elements. SRS elements that did not fit the existing structure
of the security topics were noted down separately for later analysis. This
is how the draft structure of the security topics was developed for each
scope area that fits the SRSs within the scope of the evaluation.
(c) Troubleshooting: In the third sub-step, the SRS elements (from sub-
step (b)) that did not fit into the existing structure were analyzed. The
structure was either reorganized or additional security topic were created.
During the evaluation, only some specific SRS elements primarily from
the SRS ‘ISEC information security control framework’ [113], which did
not fit directly into the existing structure, led to additional security topics,
mostly because the originating SRS covered additional aspects in the scope
area ‘System in Technical Environment’, which the other SRSs did not
address. An example of such an SRS element is “Proper management
and controlling of service providers must be in place”, which led to the
additional security topic ‘provider and service level management’.
(d) Quality assurance: To arrive at a consistent and acceptable structure,
several iterations of revisions were conducted, resulting in the structure
of the scope areas and security topics shown in Figure 4.2.
Software
• User authentication
• Component to component 
authentication
• Session management
• Authorization
• SW audit, logging and monitoring
• SW data at rest
• SW data in motion
• SW update capabilities
• SW cryptography and key 
management capabilities
• Input validation and output 
sanitization
• Software security documentation
• Secure software best practices and 
paradigms
System in Technical 
Environment
• System access control (generic)
• System audit, logging and monitoring
• System data at rest
• System data in motion
• Secure configuration and hardening
• Client security
• Server security
• System architecture security
• Physical security
• Network security
• Protection against malware
• System update and patching 
capabilities
• Backup and restore
• System cryptography and key 
management capabilities
• System security documentation
System in Organizational 
Environment
• Asset management
• Information classification and 
handling
• User and privilege management
• Change management
• Vulnerability and patch management
• Certificate and key management
• Monitoring and logging
• Incident management
• IT Service Continuity Management  
(ITSCM) / Business Continuity 
Management (BCM)
• Provider and service level 
management
• Operations and maintenance 
documentation
• Organization of information security 
(internal and third party)
• Personnel / HR security (HR)
• Awareness and Training
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Fig. 4.2. Evaluation - Step 2: Determination of security topics per scope area
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The more than 500 SRS elements from the 8 SRSs within the scope of
the evaluation could be assigned to 12 security elements in tbe scope area
‘Software’, 15 security elements in the scope area ‘System in Technical Envi-
ronment’, and 14 security elements in the scope area ‘System in Organizational
Environment’.
4.3.3 Step 3) Assign SRS Elements to Security Topics
In the third step, the elements of all SRSs in our scenario were analyzed and
assigned to the security topics in the scope areas, as derived in step 2 (multiple
assignments possible).7
Table 4.10 shows an example of the assignment of the SRS element ‘CWE-
759 - Use of a One-Way Hash without Salt’ from the SRS ‘Selected weaknesses
from CWE’ [127] to the respective security topics in their scope areas.
SRS - Selected weaknesses from CWE
SRS Element Assigned Scope Areas
CWE ID and
Weakness Title
Description Summary Software System in Technical
Environment
System in Operational
Environment
CWE-759 
-
Use of a One-Way 
Hash without a 
Salt
The software uses a one-way 
cryptographic hash against an input 
that should not be reversible, such as a 
password, but the software does not 
also use a salt as part of the input.
• User authentication
• SW cryptography and key 
management
• Access control
• System data at rest
Table 4.10. Evaluation - Step 3: Assignment of SRS elements to security topics
The SRS element ‘CWE-759: Use of One-Way Hash without Salt’8 was
assigned to the referenced scope areas and security topics because of the fol-
lowing rationale:
1. Software: Security topics ‘user authentication’ and ‘SW cryptography
and key management’. Rationale: The use of a one-way hash without salt
is a weakness, which primarily belongs to the security topic ‘user authenti-
cation’. Since the weakness is introduced by a security issue in the hashing
algorithm, it is furthermore assigned to the security topic ‘SW cryptog-
raphy and key management’. Being assigned to both topics, the weakness
7 Please note that the major difference from step 2b is that in this step, the complete
mapping of all SRS elements to all relevant security topics is done, whereas in
step 2b, the objective is only to create the draft structure of the security topics.
8 Background information on password storage and hashing: Software providing a
user-name- and password-based authentication scheme typically does not store
user passwords in plaintext, but does so in the form of a cryptographic hash
value of the password. This is done to ensure that passwords are not available in
plaintext and cannot be reversed if the password table is disclosed to an attacker.
To enhance the security of hashed passwords, an additional random value (i.e.,
salt) should be added to the computation of a hash-value, in order to complicate
so-called dictionary attack techniques.
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will be provided to SRE or security practitioners when querying the SRS
repository for typical weaknesses with regard to user authentication as
well as SW cryptography and key management.
2. System in Technical Environment: Security topics ‘access control’
and ‘system data at rest’. Rationale: Hashed passwords are stored some-
where at the system level, e.g., in files of the operating system or some-
where in the database. Therefore, this weakness also relates to the security
topics ‘access control’ and ‘system data at rest’ since passwords need to
be secured against unauthorized access and security of data at rest (in
this case passwords) must be ensured. When querying the SRS repository
for typical weaknesses related to access control and system data at rest as
well, this weakness will be shown to SRE or security practitioners. This
enables them to check on the one hand, whether passwords at the sys-
tem level are stored securely, and on the other hand, whether the access
to the password hashes is adequately protected by proper access control
mechanisms.
3. System in Operational Environment: Since the secure storage of
passwords can only be designed and implemented at the software level
and at the system level, no security element from this scope area was
assigned.
4.3.4 Step 4) Establish Relationships between SRS Elements
Once a suitable structure of scope areas and security topics has been created
and the respective SRS elements have been assigned to the security topics, the
relationships between the various SRS elements must be established, following
the generic relationship model depicted in Figure 3.5. In practice, this means
that for each element of the SRS it needs to be analyzed and documented
to which other SRS element a relationship exists. The mutual relationships
between the various SRSs as a basis for the assignments are shown in sections
3.2.2 and 3.1.
For instance, for the threat ‘Eavesdropping’ all relationships to other rele-
vant SRS elements in scope are documented, such as ‘encryption of data during
transport or logical and/or physical separation in a dedicated network’ (which
is an element of a prescriptive information and knowledge source, supporting
the mitigation of the threat) and ‘PII data transferred over networks shall be
protected against unauthorized disclosure and access’ (which is an affected raw
requirement from a compliance obligation). Furthermore, helpful relationships
between different diagnostic SRS elements can also be documented, e.g., to
concretize the generic threat with weaknesses from CWE such as ‘CWE-327:
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm’. This makes it possible
to provide all related weaknesses and vulnerabilities related to a particular
threat in order to enhance the understanding of the problems to be solved.
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Table 4.11 shows the documented relationships from the SRS element
CWE-759 to all other relevant SRS elements with a relationship to this weak-
ness in the instantiated repository.
SRS - Selected weaknesses from CWE
SRS Element SRS References
CWE ID & 
Weakness
Title
Description
Summary
PSS threat and 
risk analysis 
questionnaire
Deliberate 
threats from 
ISO/IEC 27005
PSS secure 
architecture 
guidelines
ISEC secure 
software 
development 
policy
ISEC 
information 
security control 
framework
HDP data 
privacy controls
CWE-759 
-
Use of a 
One-Way 
Hash 
without a 
Salt
The software uses a 
one-way 
cryptographic hash 
against an input that 
should not be 
reversible, such as a 
password, but the 
software does not 
also use a salt as 
part of the input.
• SW-9: Insecure 
Password 
Storage
• ISO-37: 
Corruption of 
data 
• ISO-38: Illegal 
processing of 
data 
• A-UA-001-C002: 
Consider using 
strong 
authentication 
mechanisms 
(two factor / 
multifactor) 
instead of 
username- / 
password-based 
mechanisms… 
• A-UA-007-D001: 
Do store 
passwords only 
on the server 
but not on the 
client. 
• A-UA-007-D002: 
Do keep the 
passwords 
persisted only in 
a secure way, 
e.g., … 
• SSD-37: Do not 
rely on the 
secrecy of key 
material or 
passwords in 
the client. 
• SSD-43: 
Require server 
authentication, if 
possible. 
• 402001 –
Access Control 
(general): 
Fail-secure 
Access control 
must be in place 
to restrict 
access to 
defined 
authorized / 
trained users
• 402002-02-
Authentication:
- Single-factor 
authentication 
(i.e. something 
you know, 
something you 
have or 
something you 
are) following 
good security 
practices.
• P9: Password-
based 
authentication 
shall be state-of-
the-art. 
Table 4.11. Evaluation - Step 4: Establishment of relationships between SRS ele-
ments
The rationale for the relationships established from SRS element CWE-759
to the other SRSs and their elements in scope is as follows:
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is an SRS of the SRS category
‘diagnostic information and knowledge sources’. The example shows that the
weakness motivates several elements from the SRSs ‘PSS threat and risk anal-
ysis questionnaire’ and ‘ISEC secure software development policy’. Further-
more, the weakness can be used to explain the reason for the implementation
of proper access control and authentication mechanisms as part of the SRS
‘ISEC information security control framework’ and the implementation of a
state-of-the-art password-based authentication mechanism as part of the SRS
‘HDP data privacy controls’. Also, the SRS elements of the two other represen-
tatives from the SRS category ‘diagnostic information and knowledge sources’
are correlated to show that relationships between SRS elements of SRSs in the
same SRS category can also be modeled, although this is not directly foreseen
in the ER diagram, as shown in Figure 3.5.
Practical advice: Since the relationships between SRS elements are in most
cases mutual, one would be well advised to directly document existing back-
wards relationships for each SRS element. As an example, the SRSs ‘SW-9:
Insecure Password Storage’ and ‘CWE-759 - Use of a One-Way Hash without
a Salt’ should have a mutual reference to each other since they are on a simi-
lar level of granularity and complement each other very nicely. From practical
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experience, few exceptions exist where a backwards reference might not make
sense9, in particular if the relationship from an overly generic SRS element to
other very specific SRS elements would not be understandable anymore for
the practitioners using the SRS repository. As an example, for a practitioner
is is well understandable, that if passwords are not stored securely (according
to example CWE-759 ‘Use of a One-Way Hash without a Salt’), that ‘cor-
ruption of data’ (ISO-37 from SRS [49]) might result, if an adversary can get
illegitimate access to data due to the leaked passwords. However, the other
way round is more difficult.
4.4 Views and Benefits of the Instantiated SRS
Repository
The following views, as already described in theory in section 3.4, can be
invoked on the instantiated SRS repository in order to obtain helpful infor-
mation from various SRSs and to support the elicitation of SRs.
4.4.1 Scope Area View
The scope area view shows the structure of determined security topics for the
respective scope area. As explained in section 3.4, this view is the most generic
and trivial one since it simply shows the structure of security elements for the
queried scope area(s), as determined in step 2 of the instantiation approach
(cf. section 3.3.2).
However, the scope area view provides a starting point and a good overview
on all security topics to consider for the respective scope area when carrying
out a project and developing security requirements. Thus, this view is to a
certain degree comparable to the table of contents of a single security policy
or standard, and similar to the quality factors proposed by Firesmith [22].
As an example, if a new software product is to be developed, the scope
area view for scope area ‘software’ provides 12 security elements in our eval-
uation scenario, which include all software-related elements of all SRSs to be
investigated, as depicted in Figure 4.3.
4.4.2 Security Topic View
The security topic view shows all SRS elements that are related to a specific
security topic. Through this view, all elements of the SRSs within the scope
of the evaluation can be queried that were assigned to this specific security
topic.
9 although this still is at the discretion of the people instantiating the SRS reposi-
tory
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Software
• User authentication
• Component to component authentication
• Session management
• Authorization
• SW audit, logging and monitoring
• SW data at rest
• SW data in motion
• SW update capabilities
• SW cryptography and key management capabilities
• Input validation and output sanitization
• Software security documentation
• Secure software best practices and paradigms
Fig. 4.3. Example: Scope area view for the scope area ‘Software’
As an example of the security topic view ‘user authentication’ in the scope
area ‘Software’, the following SRS elements are provided, as also depicted in
Figure 4.4:
• 9 threats from the PSS threat and risk analysis questionnaire
• 5 weaknesses from the selected weaknesses from CWE
• 5 deliberate threats from ISO/IEC 27005
• 38 recommendations from the PSS secure architecture guidelines
• 7 recommendations from the ISEC secure software development policy
• 3 compliance obligations from the ISEC information security control
framework
• 2 HDP data privacy controls.
The next example, depicted in Figure 4.5, shows the security topic view for
‘system audit, logging and monitoring’ in the scope area ‘System in Technical
Environment’.
While the SRS elements from the incorporated SRSs for the security ele-
ment ‘user authentication’ show a quite homogeneous picture with regard to
quantity and level of detail, the example for the security topic view ‘system
audit, logging and monitoring’ shows that the number, scope and level of de-
tail of the SRS elements from different SRSs assigned to the security topic
can also vary.
The last example of an SRS element view presents a security topic view
for ‘provider and service level management’ in the scope area ‘System in Or-
ganizational Environment’, where only the SRS ‘ISEC information security
control framework’ contributes eight SRS elements to the view, as depicted
in Figure 4.6.
Considering the defined SRS categories (cf. section 3.1) and the evaluation
results shown above, several benefits arise from this view for practitioners, as
it helps to:
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Software
• User authentication
• Component to 
component 
authentication
• …
Assigned SRS elements to security topic user authentication
Diagnostic Information
and Knowledge Sources
Prescriptive Information
and Knowledge Sources
Compliance Obligations
PSS threat and risk 
analysis 
questionnaire
Selected 
weaknesses from 
CWE
Deliberate threats 
from ISO/IEC 27005
PSS secure 
architecture 
guidelines
ISEC secure 
software 
development policy
ISEC information 
security control 
framework
HDP data privacy 
controls
• SW-1: Missing User 
Authentication
• SW-2: Client-Side 
User Authentication
• SW-3: Weak User 
Authentication
• SW-4: Insecure 
Initial Passwords
• SW-5: Hard-coded 
Passwords
• SW-6: Insecure 
Password Change 
Functionality
• SW-7: Kiosk Mode 
or Operating System 
Group Accounts
• SW-8: Clear-Text 
Transmission of 
Passwords
• SW-9: Insecure 
Password Storage
• CWE-304: Missing 
Critical Step in 
Authentication
• CWE-306: Missing 
Authentication for 
Critical Function
• CWE-602: Client-
Side Enforcement 
of Server-Side 
Security
• CWE-603: Use of 
Client-Side 
Authentication
• CWE-759: Use of a 
One-Way Hash 
without a Salt
• CWE-798: Use of 
Hard-coded 
Credentials
• ISO-19: 
Compromise of 
information -
Remote spying 
• ISO-25: 
Compromise of 
information - Data 
from untrustworthy 
sources
• ISO-34: 
Unauthorized 
actions -
Unauthorised use 
of equipment
• ISO-37: 
Unauthorised
actions -
Corruption of data 
• ISO-38: 
Unauthorised
actions - Illegal 
processing of data 
• A-UA-001-C001: 
Consider that users 
should be identified 
and authenticated 
with personal 
accounts.
• A-UA-001-C002: 
Consider using 
strong authentication 
mechanisms (two 
factor / multifactor) 
instead of 
username- / 
password-based 
mechanisms… 
• A-UA-007-D001: Do 
store passwords 
only on the server 
but not on the client. 
• A-UA-007-D002: Do 
keep the passwords 
persisted only in a 
secure way
• A-UA-001-N001: 
Don’t report the 
exact cause of a 
failed log on attempt. 
• …
• A-UA-002-D003: Do 
only use well-proven 
and secure 
algorithms for 
automatic password 
generation to avoid 
predictable 
sequences.
• …
• SSD-16: Use 
dedicated 
framework/library 
functions for 
password fields in 
user interfaces, for 
example password 
fields that mask the 
actual characters 
and that prevent 
content caching and 
auto-completion.
• SSD-18: After a 
failed authentication 
attempt, do not 
report the exact 
cause of the failure: 
whether the user 
was unknown or 
whether the user 
existed but the 
password was 
incorrect. 
• SSD-19: If 
passwords are 
transmitted in an 
insecure way, for 
example by 
unencrypted email, 
the lifetime of those 
passwords must be 
limited appropriately 
and a password 
change must be 
enforced after first 
use.
• …
• 402001 – Access 
Control (general): 
Fail-secure Access 
control must be in 
place to restrict 
access to defined 
authorized / trained 
users
• 402002-01- Explicit 
proof of identity 
required if the 
access is restricted 
to defined users, i.e. 
the digital identity is 
assignable to a 
person, department, 
etc.
• 402002-02-
Authentication:
- Single-factor 
authentication (i.e. 
something you 
know, something 
you have or 
something you are) 
following good 
security practices.
(Note: The example 
applies for “security 
Level 1”)
• P8: Every access to 
network and user 
interfaces shall be 
authenticated.
• P9: Password-based 
authentication shall 
be state-of-the-art. 
state-of-the-art 
password based 
user authentication 
comprises the 
following aspects. 
Each aspect shall be 
supported.
a) The user shall be 
able to change his 
password. 
b) A configurable 
password policy, 
allowing to enforce 
- password changes 
at regular intervals, 
- complex 
passwords with 
sufficient length, 
- policy changeable 
by administration 
role only.
c) Mechanisms to 
prevent password 
guessing, e.g. 
enforcing delays 
after failed 
authentication 
requests
d) …
Fig. 4.4. Example: Security topic view for ‘user authentication’
• Understand the problem space for each security topic and the motivation
for utilizing related prescriptive information and knowledge as well as
compliance obligations.
• Use the information about typical threats and weaknesses during the ap-
plication of SRE methods.
• Consider existing recommendations and best practices when analyzing a
security topic and aligning it with software or system (security) architects’
viewpoints.
• Identify identical or similar raw requirements from different compliance
obligations to increase the efficiency for fulfilling these requirements.
• Incorporate results from previous applications of SRE methods to avoid
the recurrence of security problems.
• Review the scope, quality, and completeness of incorporated SRSs by com-
paring assigned SRS elements for each security topic. The analysis result
can reveal:
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System in Technical 
Environment
• System access control 
(generic)
• System audit, logging 
and monitoring
• …
Assigned SRS elements to security topic system audit, logging and monitoring
Diagnostic Information
and Knowledge Sources
Prescriptive Information
and Knowledge Sources
Compliance Obligations
PSS threat and risk 
analysis 
questionnaire
Selected 
weaknesses from 
CWE
Deliberate threats 
from ISO/IEC 27005
PSS secure 
architecture 
guidelines
ISEC secure 
software 
development policy
ISEC information 
security control 
framework
HDP data privacy 
controls
• SW-22: Insufficient 
Logging of Security-
Relevant Events
• SW-23: Sensitive 
Data in Log Files
• SW-24: Missing Log 
Server Integration
• CD-20: Lack of 
monitoring of 
security events
• N/A • ISO-34: 
Unauthorised
actions -
Unauthorised use of 
equipment
• ISO-37: 
Unauthorised
actions - Corruption 
of data 
• ISO-38: 
Unauthorised
actions - Illegal 
processing of data 
• ISO-40: 
Compromise of 
functions - Abuse of 
rights
• A-UA-001-D005: Do 
log successful and 
failed log on 
attempts centrally.
• A-MWP-001-D001: 
Do (where permitted 
and possible) 
employ automated 
tools to continuously 
monitor 
workstations, 
servers …
• A-MWP-001-D008: 
Monitor for use and 
attempted use of 
external devices.
• A-MWP-001-C004: 
Consider using 
automated 
monitoring tools for 
behavior-based 
anomaly detection to 
complement and 
enhance traditional 
signature-based 
detection.
• A-NWS-003-D001: 
Do log at appropriate 
levels
• …
• N/A • 402006-03: 
Unauthorized 
modifications are 
detectable, e.g. by a 
simple information 
versioning
• 402007-01: Audit 
record with access 
control decisions 
must be in place 
(including access by 
privileged users); 
audit records must 
be protected
• P18: Logging of user 
management actions 
shall be provided
• P19: Logging of PHI 
processing shall be 
provided
• P20: Log files shall 
be protected against 
unauthorized access
Fig. 4.5. Example: Security topic view for ‘system audit, logging and monitoring’
– Missing SRS elements in an SRS (i.e., SRS elements covered by one
SRS but not by other SRSs).
– SRS elements of an SRS that might exceed the intended scope of an
SRS (e.g., system-specific weaknesses, although the intended scope of
an SRS is only on software)
4.4.3 SRS Element View
The SRS element view shows for a single selected SRS element all other SRS
elements with a relationship to it. For instance, for an element from a compli-
ance obligation, all related diagnostic and prescriptive information and knowl-
edge sources as well as results from SRE methods are provided that help to
understand and address it.
An SRS element view example for the SRS element “CWE-759 - Use of a
One-Way Hash without a Salt” was already shown in Table 4.11.10
The following benefits arise from this view:
10 Please note that step 4 of the instantiation approach forms the basis for the SRS
element view, i.e., the view of relationships established between SRS elements.
82
System in Operational 
Environment
• …
• Provider and service 
level management
• …
Assigned SRS elements to security topic provider and service level management
Diagnostic Information
and Knowledge Sources
Prescriptive Information
and Knowledge Sources
Compliance Obligations
PSS threat and 
risk analysis 
questionnaire
Selected 
weaknesses 
from CWE
Deliberate 
threats from 
ISO/IEC 27005
PSS secure 
architecture 
guidelines
ISEC secure 
software 
development 
policy
ISEC information security control framework HDP data 
privacy 
controls
• N/A • N/A • N/A • N/A • N/A • 407001-01: Before selecting a service provider 
the risks from exposing the information to the 
service provider must be assessed
• 407001-02: The provider develops/implements 
and/or operates security controls having the 
required security capabilities for level 1
• 407001-03: No obvious product/ service errors 
exist; flaws are addressed in a timely manner
• 407001-04: A reasonable management and 
controlling of the service provider must be 
established.
• 407001-05: Service levels, security, legal 
requirements and confidentiality agreements 
are part of the contracts
• 407001-06: Regular monitoring and audits 
should be performed
• 407002-02 Operations and development of 
Information processing systems (e.g. ITIL 
processes)
• 407002-04: Standards for Provider’s HR 
management / employment processes are 
applied
• N/A
Fig. 4.6. Example: Security topic view for ‘provider and service level management’
• Possibility to view all related diagnostic information and knowledge
sources, as well as compliance obligations for a prescriptive SRS element.
This supports the mitigation of threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities
and moreover helps to properly address raw requirements stemming from
compliance obligations.
• Possibility to view all related diagnostic and prescriptive information and
knowledge sources that help to analyze and address a raw requirement or
control from a compliance obligation.
• Possibility to view which diagnostic information and knowledge sources
are incorporated into an SRE method result (e.g., a weakness identified
from a threat and risk analysis).
4.4.4 SRS Coverage View
The SRS coverage view is an additional view, which cannot be requested
solely on the instantiated SRS repository, but requires additional information
regarding the coverage (or consideration) of a particular SRS element in the
specified set of SRs within a particular project. As a prerequisite, for each
specified SR, the relationships to the SRS elements must be documented,
to enable retrieving those SRSs that are already addressed or incorporated
by the developed set of SRs. In other words, it must be documented which
threats and weaknesses or raw requirements from compliance obligations are
addressed or considered when an SR is specified.
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The SRS coverage view allows checking the degree of coverage and com-
pleteness of SRS elements. Checks can be helpful:
• For an SRS: e.g. to reveal all threats or weaknesses, for which no SRs
have been specified so far, and to check if for all raw requirements of a
compliance obligation a SR does exist in the project-specific set of SRSs
11.
• For a security topic, e.g., to check whether all SRS element of a security
topic are already incorporated.
• For an entire scope area: It can be analyzed if all relevant SRSs are ad-
dressed in the requirements specification, before it is handed over to the
software or system architects.
4.5 Perceptions and Challenges Encountered during
Evaluation
The proposed model for structuring and reusing SRSs as well as the instan-
tiation approach could be applied successfully in practice within the defined
evaluation scenario. Both the model and the instantiation approach were suc-
cessfully applied to the incorporated SRSs, resulting in a Siemens-specific
SRS repository based on the defined evaluation scenario. The various views
on the instantiated SRS repository underline the practical applicability and
usefulness of the contributions developed in this PhD thesis.
In this section, perceptions and challenges with a potential impact on the
resulting instantiated SRS repository will be described that appeared during
the instantiation of the Siemens-specific SRS repository. The perceptions and
challenges reveal potential pitfalls to be avoided when instantiating the model
and summarize potential adjustments or variants of the described model and
the instantiation approach. For each challenge or problem, potential solutions
are proposed.
4.5.1 General Influences on the Creation of an SRS Repository
Two general influences on the creation of an SRS repository were identified.
First, the human factor and the subjectivity of the person(s) performing the
instantiation, and second, the types and levels of detail of the incorporated
SRSs in the resulting SRS repository.
11 Please note that this view does not necessarily allow a statement on the fulfillment
of a compliance obligation since the extent of coverage for each SRS element as
well as the appropriateness and effectiveness of the measures designed to fulfill
the requirement cannot be incorporated into this view.
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Human Factor and Subjectivity
Challenge and perception: The instantiation approach is performed by hu-
mans. Therefore, subjectivity and personal experience will influence the re-
sulting SRS repository, particularly if no preferred SRS (e.g., an internal in-
formation security policy or an external international IT security standard)
exists as the primary structure for the SRS repository, but a completely new
structure of scope areas and security topics is to be developed.
Depending on the person(s) and their knowledge, experience, and back-
ground, the resulting SRS repository will look different in terms of structure
and terminology.
As an example of how the human factor and subjectivity can influence a
resulting SRS repository, particularly the structure and terminology of the
security topics, ‘access control’ is used. Access control as used in ISO/IEC
27001 [47] incorporates all kinds of organizational and technical aspects re-
lated to controlling access to information, including authentication, autho-
rization, user and privilege management. In contrast, other more technical
standards and glossaries consider access control synonymous with authoriza-
tion, which is a significantly smaller scope than that used in ISO/IEC 27001.
Another terminology-related example concerns the denomination of the
‘bad guy’, the person who tries to compromise the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of information, software, or systems. Terminologies used in
SRSs range from attacker via adversary to threat agent.
It can be summarized that the fewer constraints and preconditions are
specified for the instantiation of the SRS repository, the higher the likelihood
for an increased level of personal preferences and subjectivity in the instanti-
ated repository.
The human factor and subjectivity therefore has influence on
• the number and granularity of the scope areas and security elements being
determined, and
• the terminology used for scope areas, security elements, and other terms.
Proposed solution: Although the described instantiation approach recom-
mends as a prerequisite that decisions regarding the structure of scope areas
and security topics as well as the preferred terminology should be derived
from many prerequisites to be clarified for the instantiation and the SRS to
be incorporated, the evaluation revealed that there still remains a certain de-
gree of freedom for the instantiating person(s) with regard to structure and
terminology. It is therefore highly recommended to thoroughly clarify all pre-
conditions (cf. section 3.3.1) and to be as specific as possible. Furthermore,
early reviews with relevant stakeholders should be done for each instantiation
approach step in order to align the chosen structure and terminology at an
early point in time.
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Security Requirements Sources
Challenge and perception: Most of the incorporated SRSs in the evaluation
scenario were used straightforward during the instantiation. However, the en-
tire SRS ‘deliberate threats from ISO/IEC 27005’ [49]) and a limited number
of SRS elements from the other SRSs in scope caused problems due to in-
creased instantiation effort and reduced the usability and benefits of the views
on the instantiated repository.
Problems with SRS elements occurred during the evaluation if:
• SRS elements were specified in an overly generic manner;
• The level of detail of a single SRS element or an entire SRS differed a lot
in comparison to the other incorporated SRSs.
An example of an exceptional, overly generic SRS element from [113] is “SSD-
3: The security of the Siemens IT infrastructure must not be jeopardized by
the software or one of its components.” While most of the other SRS elements
from this SRS could reasonably be used to determine and assign scope areas
and security topics and to establish beneficial and manageable relationships
to other SRS elements, such overly generic SRS elements were troublesome
during the evaluation.
The same problem regarding overly generic SRS elements applies to the
entire SRS ‘deliberate threats from ISO/IEC 27005’ [49]. As an example,
threats like “corruption of data” or “unauthorized access to information” are
almost relevant for all security topics. Furthermore, they have relationships to
almost all other SRS elements within the evaluation scope. Therefore, besides
the challenge that overly generic SRS elements do not support the determi-
nation of scope areas and security topics, they result in hugely nonsensical
assignments of SRS elements to security topics and lead to a massively in-
creased number of relationships between the SRS elements. If from a very
generic threat like ‘corruption of data’ hundreds of SRS elements from other
more specific SRSs are referenced, the rationale for a relationship might not
be clear anymore for the practitioners.
Proposed solution: Preferably, only a homogeneous set of SRS elements should
be selected as a basis for the instantiation of an SRS repository. If overly
generic SRS elements are to be incorporated anyway though (e.g., due to
business decisions), the following approach turned out to overcome the above-
mentioned challenges to a certain degree:
• Overly generic SRS elements should be left out for the determination of
the scope areas (step 1) and security topics (step 2) in the instantiation
approach since they do not provide any added value for the determination
of the SRS repository structure.
• The assignment of SRS elements to security topics can be done according
to step 3 of the instantiation approach.
86
• To limit the number of relationships between SRS elements with very
different levels of detail, an indirection from a generic SRS element to
other SRS elements with a medium level of detail can be done, which in
turn references the more detailed SRS elements.
The following example shows an indirection via SRS elements with an
intermediate level of detail (here 402001 – Access Control) to more detailed
SRS elements (here CWE-759, CWE-798, ...):
• Corruption of data
–> References SRS element with medium level of detail
– 402001 – Access Control (general): Fail-secure access control must be
in place to restrict access to defined authorized / trained users
–> References SRS elements with high level of detail
· CWE-759 - Use of a One-Way Hash without a Salt
· CWE-798 - Use of Hard-Coded Credentials
· ...
· SW-1 - Missing User Authentication
· SW-2 - Client-Side User Authentication
· ...
· SSD-37: Do not rely on the secrecy of key material or passwords
in the client.
· SSD-43: Require server authentication, if possible.
· ..
4.5.2 Instantiation Approach
The instantiation approach worked properly as described in the evaluation.
However, some particularities and challenges should be regarded related to the
assignment of SRS elements to security topics (i.e. step 3 of the instantiation
approach) and the rationale used to assign SRS elements to security topics
and to establish the relationships between the SRS elements.
Assignment of SRS Elements to Security Topics
Challenge and perception: A single SRS element can, and often should, be
assigned to multiple security topics in the determined scope areas. Examples
of multiple assignments of an SRS element to security topics are presented in
sections 4.3 and 4.4.3 (cf. Table 4.10). During the evaluation the vast majority
of SRS elements could be assigned to security topics without any problems.
For security experts, this assignment step is straightforward. However, in
cases where SRS elements primarily address technical aspects that neverthe-
less implicitly also require operations and management aspects, also security
topics in the scope area ‘System in Organizational Environment’ might also
be of interest for security and SRE practitioners.
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As an example of the evaluation scenario, SRS elements related to the
security topic ‘secure configuration and hardening’ also implicitly incorporate
related organizational aspects, meaning that processes or procedures must
be in place that ensure that secure configuration and hardening is actually
done in practice, since secure configuration and hardening is not only a sta-
ble condition that needs to be achieved once, but requires regular activities.
Although there is no concrete organizational or procedural SRS element for
secure configuration and hardening within the SRS elements within the scope
of the evaluation, it nevertheless might be of interest to create a security
topic in the scope area ‘System in Organizational Environment’ and assign
technical SRS elements related to secure configuration and hardening. Alter-
natively, new SRS elements could also be created in order to complement the
incorporated SRS elements.
Another challenge concerning the assignment of SRS elements to security
topics arises if SRS elements are not ‘atomic’, meaning that a single SRS ele-
ment addresses multiple aspects of the problem space, which would normally
have to be separated into several SRS elements. Such SRS elements would
have to be assigned to different security topics, potentially also in different
scope areas, although they would also cover additional aspects that do not fit
to a particular security topic.
The following example shows this circumstance: In the good case, SRS el-
ements are clearly separated, as the logging example shows. The SRS element
“A-MWP-001-D001: Do (where permitted and possible) employ automated
tools to continuously monitor workstations, servers and mobile devices for
active, up-to-date anti-malware protection with anti-virus, anti-spyware, per-
sonal firewalls and host-based IPS functionality...” can be clearly assigned to
the security topic ‘system audit, logging and monitoring’ in the scope area
‘System in Technical Environment’, since it requires a technical system capa-
bility. The SRS element “A-NWS-001-D004: Regularly check the log events:
“If you’re going to log it, read it”.” can be clearly assigned to the security
topic ‘monitoring and logging’ in the scope area ‘System in Organizational
Environment’, since it clearly refers to a procedure and the organization that
regularly has to check the log files. However, there are also mixed forms of SRS
elements that have both a technical and an organizational aspect and there-
fore normally should be treated as separate SRS elements. The SRS element
“A-MWP-001-D008: Do limit the use of external devices to those that are
really necessary for the operation and maintenance of the solution/product.
Monitor for use and attempted use of external devices.” is a good example of
such a mixed SRS element.
Proposed solution: A general solution for the first challenge concerning the
potential multiple assignments of a single SRS element cannot be provided,
since the decision about which SRS element to assign where is a very individual
one that depends on various factors such as the quality and level of detail of
the incorporated SRS element, the use cases to be supported, as well as the
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structure of scope areas and security topics created. Therefore, it needs to be
decided and aligned on a case-wise basis how to handle each SRS element.
Regarding the latter challenge concerning SRS elements that incorporate
multiple security aspects in different scope areas, either a separation of the
SRS elements into multiple SRS elements can be done prior to assigning it to
security topics and establishing the relationships to the other SRS elements
(which is the recommended option), or multiple assignments of SRS elements
to security topics are an option that can be selected. In the latter case, suitable
comments should be added to the concerned SRS element to indicate the
circumstance.
Rationale for Assignments of SRS Elements to Security Topics
To successfully create an SRS repository, several organizational and skill-
related prerequisites are required, as explained in section 3.3.1. Profound
security knowledge and expertise is required to identify, classify, compare,
correlate, and use SRS elements. Only security experts should assign the SRS
elements to security topics in order to ensure that the assignments are correct
and complete. During the evaluation, a challenge related to this process step
was detected when discussing the resulting assignments of SRS elements to
security topics with SRE practitioners. The problem in some cases was that
the rationale for the assigment of a security element to a security topic is in
some (rather exceptional) cases not clear to the practitioners using the SRS
repository. Therefore, if in such cases the rationale is not properly documented
in the SRS repository, the SRE practitioners cannot draw their conclusions re-
garding the mapping and might wonder about the reason for the assignments
and possibly omit certain aspects due to this lack of understanding.
Therefore, assignments of SRS elements to security topics must either be
understandable without requiring security expert knowledge, or the descrip-
tion for each SRS element needs to provide this information. If this is not the
case, the rationale for the mapping should be documented somewhere for the
practitioners.
Proposed solution: In step 3 of the instantiation approach, an additional re-
view of the assignments between SRS elements and security topics should be
conducted, ideally performed by non-security experts, to check if the assign-
ments are understandable. If not, the assignment and the description text of
the concerned SRS elements must be revised and explanatory text should be
added to the repository, e.g., as part of the description text for each SRS
element.
4.5.3 Structural Challenges
Challenge and perception: During the evaluation, instantiation steps 1 and 2
(cf. section 3.3.2) worked as intended and turned out to be pragmatic and
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useful for creating a structure of scope areas and security topics, as depicted
in Figure 4.2.
In step 3 of the instantiation approach, it was also straightforward to assign
SRS elements to the determined structure of security topics, except for the
challenges explained in section 4.5.2. However, the other way around, i.e., the
security topic views, can be more problematic in some cases, especially if the
security topic selected (during step 2 of the instantiation approach) was too
coarse-grained. When performing a security topic view, in some cases (mostly
for security topics with many assigned SRS elements), the variety of different
security aspects and the level of details can be very high, particularly if the
scope and level of detail of the incorporated SRS varies (cf. section 4.5.1).
As an example, for the security topic ‘user authentication’, various security
aspects ranging from good practices for password storage to certificate-based
authentication aspects are covered (cf. Figure 4.4). In such a case, SRE prac-
titioners would have to go through all assigned SRS elements and could not
avoid unnecessary SRS elements, e.g., SRS elements on secure password stor-
age (salted hashes, etc.) if a strong authentication mechanism is prescribed
anyway.
Proposed solution: To solve such cases, three alternatives are proposed.
• Revise the determined (flat) structure of the SRS elements and split the
affected single security topics into multiple security topics (on the same hi-
erarchy level). Note: This has the disadvantage that the number of security
topics increases and that potential preferred security element structures,
e.g. aimed at compliance with a specific standard, cannot be kept.
• Adapt the model by adding an additional hierarchy level below the se-
curity topics, e.g., by subdividing the security topic ‘user authentication’
into weak / single factor and strong / multi-factor authentication. Note:
This has the drawback that the (ER) model as described in section 3.2
needs to be extended or redesigned; also, it becomes more complicated for
practitioners to use.
• Tag each SRS element using additional meta-information. By doing this,
additional selection criteria could be added for each SRS element to only
show relevant SRS elements, using more complex database queries. Note:
The downside of this solution alternative is that additional tags and meta-
information have to be determined and maintained together with the gen-
eral structure of the security topics.
Relationships between SRS elements
Challenge and perception: The vast majority of the overall effort of the instan-
tiation of an organization-specific SRS repository lies in step 4, the establish-
ment of relationships between SRS elements, which took approximately 70%
of the overall time. In theory, each element from a SRS has to be compared
with all SRS elements from the other SRSs in scope, creating massive effort,
particularly if a high number of SRS elements is to be incorporated.
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Proposed solution: The high effort for establishing the relationships between
the SRS elements can be compensated to a certain degree:
In general, detailed knowledge about the incorporated SRSs (which topics
are covered where in which SRS) should be available present in the team
instantiating the model.
In addition, also the search space for SRS elements to be compared can
be decreased in most cases. Based on step 3, instead of sequentially parsing
through all possible SRS elements in scope, they can be filtered only for SRS
elements from the other SRSs which are assigned to the identical security
topics. In most cases, particularly with regard to the more technical SRS
elements, this filter helps a lot to decrease the complexity and the number
of SRS elements to be compared, and nearly all possible SRS elements with
actual relationships can be properly assigned.
However, for very generic SRS elements e.g., ‘deliberate threats from
ISO/IEC 27005’ [49] where a clear mapping to user authentication or log-
ging is not obvious, huge effort for the mapping needs to be done. In such
cases, where the relationships are not obvious and no searches for keywords
(logging, log file, monitoring etc.) can be used, again detailed security knowl-
edge is required.
5Summary and Future Work
“Most creative work is a process of people passing ideas and inspirations
from the past into the future and adding their own creativity along the way.”
Joichi Ito
5.1 Summary
Several challenges with regard to SRE are stated in the literature that can
also be observed in practice. Often, the maturity of SR specifications is poor
(e.g., [96,133]). This situation is aggravated by the lack of knowledge and skills
regarding security and SRE (e.g., [23]), the fact that SRE methods and tech-
niques are rarely applied for the development of SRs (e.g., [96]), and the fact
that security information and knowledge sources are seldom used in practice
(e.g., [29]). Besides these shortcomings, there is an increasing number of inter-
nal and external compliance obligations as important SRSs to be considered
when developing SRs.
Therefore, support must be provided to SRE practitioners in order to in-
corporate information and knowledge sources as well as compliance obligations
in a well-structured and reusable way to mitigate the lack of security skills
and knowledge and to avoid unnecessary effort for identifying, understanding,
and correlating SRS elements on a project-wise basis.
The research activities described in this PhD thesis focus on the various
types of SRSs, particularly on their categorization and structuring in order
to provide them to practitioners in a reusable form. The goal is to address
the above-mentioned challenges by supporting organizations with the identi-
fication and structuring of relevant SRSs and, based on this, the creation of
an organization-specific SRS repository that fulfills the particular needs of an
organization. The repository is intended to aid requirements engineers and
development teams during the elicitation and analysis of SRs by providing
SRSs in a reusable form and making the relationships between the various
SRSs understandable.
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To reach this goal, the research effort during the course of this PhD thesis
was spent on the following aspects:
• Identification, structuring, and specification of a consistent classification
for the most important SRSs.
• Development of a generic model that can be used for structuring and
reusing relevant SRSs.
• Specification of criteria and a structured approach for instantiating the
generic model for a given scenario in order to create an organization-
specific SRS repository.
The resulting SRS repository is intended to be used by development teams
during the elicitation and analysis of security requirements with the aim of
understanding the security problem space, incorporating all relevant require-
ments sources, and avoiding unnecessary effort for identifying, understanding,
and correlating applicable security requirements sources on a project-wise ba-
sis.
The following contributions were elaborated and presented as part of this
PhD thesis:
In section 3.1, a categorization of reusable, security-specific SRSs to be
considered in the model was introduced, which was derived from information
and perceptions obtained from the state of the art and the state of the prac-
tice reviews, presented in chapter 2. The SRS categories were used for the
development of an extended security engineering approach (cf. section 3.1.1)
and discussed in the context of the Twin Teaks model (cf. section 3.1.2).
Using the SRS categories, a meta-model and a related ER diagram for
structuring and reusing SRSs including its components were presented in sec-
tion 3.2. The model serves as a basis for the instantiation of an organization-
specific SRS repository. An overview and explanation of the model were pro-
vided in section 3.2.1, followed by the associated ER diagram for the model
in section 3.2.2.
To instantiate the model for a concrete scenario, general prerequisites and
the approach for instantiating the model along with all theoretical process
steps, inputs, and outputs for creating the SRS repository were described in
section 3.3.
To use and benefit from an instantiated SRS repository, four different
model views were introduced and explained in section 3.4, which provide all
relevant information for understanding and analyzing the security problem
space, and for specifying security requirements. These views enable automated
analyzability of an instantiated SRS repository view by providing SRE prac-
titioners with useful automated queries.
All developed contributions, i.e., the SRS categories, the model, and the in-
stantiation approach were evaluated in a comprehensive real-world industrial
scenario at Siemens. The development of the three scope areas was published
and discussed in [101]. The theoretical model and the instantiation approach
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were published in [102]. The model, the instantiation approach, and the prac-
tical evaluation approach were presented in [99, 103, 104]. Related aspects in
the area of SRE methods were presented in [105], which were also used in
part for the evaluation of the model. The evaluation incorporated over 500
elements from eight different SRSs, covering at least one representative per
SRS category. Using several examples from the instantiated repository, it was
shown that the proposed model can be used for a variety of different SRSs (cf.
chapter 4). The instantiation in the described scenario showed that the model
is capable of fulfilling the desired business demands and research hypotheses
specified in theory in section 1.3. Perceptions and challenges encountered dur-
ing the evaluation were explained in section 4.5 to highlight potential pitfalls
and support future instantiations of the model.
The desired model capabilities (i.e., business demands and research hy-
potheses) are fulfilled by the following contributions and evaluation results:
H1 - Scope: The model can be used for software SRs and for the system level,
as well as for technical, physical, and organizational aspects.
In general, the model and its described components (i.e., scope areas, security
topics, and SRSs, as described in section 3.2) are flexible enough to develop
arbitrary structures as needed by a particular organization.
Based on the business demand to support software, the system level, and
related technical, physical, and organizational aspects, a structure of the fol-
lowing three scope areas was developed during the evaluation (cf. section 4.1).
• Software
• System in Technical Environment
• System in Organizational Environment
The structure was determined in step 1 of the instantiation approach and was
successfully used as the basis for the subsequent steps of the instantiation ap-
proach. For each scope area, a limited number of relevant security topics were
determined, and for each security topic, all SRS elements in the evaluation
scope could be assigned (i.e., step 2, cf. section 3.3.2).
As the SRS elements within the scope of the evaluation contained a variety
of technical, physical, and organizational aspects, even from different SRS
categories, the first business demand and research hypothesis (H1) is fulfilled.
H2 - Flexibility: The model is flexible enough to structure (most of) the
relevant SRSs.
Using step 2 of the proposed instantiation approach (cf. section 3.3.2), a suit-
able structure of security topics for the three determined scope areas could
be created (cf. section 4.3). The developed structure was flexible enough to
assign the over 500 SRS elements in the evaluation scenario to the determined
security topics. Example assignments were demonstrated using security topics
views, cf. section 4.4.2 and Table 4.10.
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Moreover, the relationships between most of the over 500 SRS elements
in the evaluation scenario could be identified and documented. Relationships
between SRS elements were demonstrated applying the SRS element view on
three example SRS elements (cf. section 4.4.3 and Table 4.11).
While the model in general can be considered flexible enough to structure
any kind of SRS element, the evaluation revealed increased effort for the in-
stantiation, particularly for the assignment of SRS elements to security topics
and the determination of relationships between SRS elements, if overly generic
SRS elements were used and the level of detail of the incorporated SRS ele-
ments differed. This decreases the usability and the benefits of the views on
the instantiated repository since overly generic SRS elements are assigned to
almost any security topic and, moreover, relationships to almost all SRS ele-
ments exist (cf. section 4.5.1). Business demand and research hypothesis H2
can therefore also be considered fulfilled. However, the evaluation showed that
certain constraints regarding SRSs exist since the effort for the instantiation
and the usability of the resulting SRS repository depend on a homogeneous
level of detail of the incorporated SRS elements (cf. section 4.5.1).
H3 - Reuse: The reuse of information and knowledge is supported to avoid
unnecessary effort for the identification, classification, comparison,
correlation, and use of elements from different SRSs.
The evaluation showed that the instantiation approach (cf. section 4.3) works
well for the identification, classification, comparison, and correlation of ele-
ments from different SRSs. In combination with the presented views on the
instantiated SRS repository (cf. section 4.4), information can be requested in
a consistent, complete, and correlated manner by SRE practitioners.
Reusability implies completeness and correctness of the instantiated SRS
repository and efficient and easy use of the resulting repository for practi-
tioners. Completeness and correctness of the assignments and relationships
of the SRS elements must be achieved through proper instantiation of the
model and the resulting SRS repository. Only if the organizational and skill-
related prerequisites for the instantiation of the model are fulfilled (cf. section
3.3.1), sufficient security knowledge and expertise is available to know in de-
tail and understand the incorporated SRSs, and to identify, classify, compare,
correlate, and use security information and knowledge sources. This allows
providing practitioners with a comprehensive and consistent set of SRS ele-
ments with properly assigned security topics and reasonable relationships to
other SRS elements, without requiring additional significant effort for iden-
tifying, comparing, and consolidating different SRSs in order to support the
elicitation of SRs.
Regarding completeness and correctness difficulties with regard to overly
generic SRS elements or SRS elements with very different levels of detail
may exist and need to be resolved (cf. section 4.5.1). Moreover, completeness
and correctness depend to a certain degree on the person(s) performing the
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instantiation approach due to the human factor and subjectivity (cf. section
4.5.1).
Efficiency and usability of the instantiated repository are achieved through
the provision of four different views for a variety of different purposes (cf. sec-
tion 3.4). These views enable practitioners to query for the desired information
from the instantiated model and support the elicitation of SRs, as shown in
various examples in section 4.4.
H4 - Relationships between SRSs: The relationships between different kinds
of security information and knowledge (e.g., diagnostic vs. prescriptive) shall
be understandable.
Based on step 4 in the instantiation approach (cf. sections 3.3.2), relevant
relationships between the SRS elements were identified and documented dur-
ing the evaluation (cf. sections 4.3.4). Relationships between diagnostic and
prescriptive security information and knowledge sources could be established,
along with SRSs from the other defined SRS categories (cg. section 3.1.3),
namely compliance obligations as well as results and artifacts from SRE meth-
ods. SRE practitioners can make use of the established relationships using the
SRS elements view (cf. sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.3).
To ensure that the established relationships can actually be understood
by SRE practitioners, three aspects should be ensured, as emphasized during
the evaluation:
• The level of detail of the incorporated SRS elements must not differ too
much in order to have a homogeneous set of relationships between the
SRS elements (cf. sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.3).
• A consistent and aligned terminology should be used throughout the in-
stantiated repository (cf. section 4.5.1).
• Regular and early reviews of the assignments between SRS elements and
security topics should be conducted to check if the assignments and rela-
tionships are understandable; this check should ideally be performed by
staff without security expertise (cf. sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). If relation-
ships are not intuitively understandable, the assignment and the descrip-
tion text of the concerned SRS elements must be revised and explanatory
text should be added to the repository.
H5 - Quality and baseline security: It is possible to support the check for
quality and completeness of SRs in terms of ‘baseline security’, covering the
most prevalent security aspects of the problem space.
The desired model capability regarding baseline security is supported with
the model through the use of a set of mandatory SRSs (e.g., the most relevant
threats, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and attacks) as input for the instantiation
of the model. Thereby, mandatory SRSs become part of the resulting SRS
repository, which ensures that the most prevalent aspects of the problem space
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are considered when eliciting security requirements. Using the SRS coverage
views (see sections 3.4.4 and 4.4.4), it can be verified which of the defined
minimum SRSs are already incorporated in the specified set of SRs.
Although the model by itself is capable of providing and checking that the
defined mandatory SRS elements were used during the development of SRs,
the quality of the resulting SRs and the resulting security measures aimed
at fulfilling the SRs and addressing the related threats, weaknesses, and vul-
nerabilities cannot be ensured solely by the model but must be supported by
additional semantic reviews conducted by human professionals. Nevertheless,
the basis for developing SRs can be improved through the following two as-
pects. First, the higher the quality of the SRS repository, the better the basis
for the development of SRs. Since the instantiation approach is performed
by a skilled security expert and the developed repository is reviewed and im-
proved several times, quality assurance is done to ensure that the terminology
used is consistent and that the assignments and relationships are understand-
able, complete, and correct. Second, the additional content of the assigned
and correlated SRSs extends the basis for the elicitation of SRs. The number
of SRS elements that can be used for the development of SRs is not only lim-
ited to an isolated SRS, but includes all information and knowledge from the
incorporated SRSs. The respective relationships and views can be used for the
elicitation of SRs. Obviously, the added value for SRE practitioners depends
on the quantity and quality of information included in the SRSs and therefore
cannot be claimed for any case. However, as the example for user authentica-
tion in the evaluation scenario showed (cf. section 4.4.2), multiple additional
information and knowledge sources are provided that were not considered
by or provided at such a level of detail by the other SRSs. As an example,
the two compliance obligations for user authentication from the SRS ‘HDP
data privacy controls’ are enhanced by nine threats from the PSS threat and
risk analysis questionnaire, five weaknesses from the selected weaknesses from
CWE, five deliberate threats from ISO/IEC 27005, 38 recommendations from
the PSS secure architecture guidelines, and seven recommendations from the
ISEC secure software development policy. As can be easily recognized in Fig-
ure 4.4, the additionally provided SRS elements offer much more information
and knowledge that can be used for the elicitation of the security requirements
than if only the two raw requirements from the HDP data privacy controls
had been used.
In addition to the use of the instantiated repository and the SRS cov-
erage views, additional reviews of the developed SRs and the resulting SR
specification should be performed as part of the SR(E) process in a project.
The contributions presented in this PhD thesis help to address the short-
comings presented in section 1.2 in the following ways:
• The lack of knowledge and skills regarding security and SRE can be mit-
igated through the use of an instantiated organization-specific, under-
standable, and correct SRS repository. The repository supports the reuse
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of information and knowledge of the incorporated SRS elements without
requiring IT security expert knowledge to identify, classify, compare, cor-
relate, and use elements from different SRSs.
• The problem that information and knowledge sources are seldom used in
practice cannot be solved solely by the model or by an instantiated SRS
repository, since the identification and use of SRSs must be anchored in an
organization, e.g., in development processes and quality gates. Neverthe-
less, the instantiated SRS repository provides all SRSs that were identified
and considered to be relevant for the organization at the time of model
instantiation. Therefore, it provides all the SRSs incorporated in the re-
sulting SRS repository that address the hurdle faced by SRE practitioners
when identifying SRSs on a project-wise basis.
• The fact that SRE methods and techniques are rarely applied for the
development of SRs cannot be improved by the presented model and ap-
proach. However, diagnostic information and knowledge sources (cf. sec-
tion 2.4.1) can be used as valuable input, particularly for the application
of analysis-oriented SRE methods (cf. section 2.5) such as attack trees or
abuse cases.
• The increasing number of internal and external compliance obligations
as an important SRS to be considered when developing SRs is addressed
by taking into account a dedicated SRS category (cf. section 3.1.3) for
compliance obligations.
5.2 Comparison with Related Work
The following relations exist between the results of this PhD thesis and the
SRE methods, processes, and frameworks presented in the state of the art and
the state of the practice (cf. chapter 2).
In general, the proposed model and the instantiated repository fit to any
SRE process (e.g., SQUARE [70]) and method (cf. section 2.5.1) that follows
a security-engineering-based approach as presented in section 2.2.1. In other
words, the contributions of this PhD thesis support and complement any
SRE process and method in which SRs are derived from threats, weaknesses,
and vulnerabilities since the model is able to incorporate and provide SRS
elements from diagnostic information and knowledge sources as well as from
previous results from analysis-oriented SRE methods. As an example, a threat
and risk analysis (as a representative of an analysis-oriented SRE method)
can be supported using the ‘diagnostic information and knowledge sources’
of an instantiated SRS repository. Relevant SRS elements can be obtained
and applied simply in workshops using the available views without requiring
lengthy identification of potential threats and weaknesses during a workshop.
Moreover, since not only diagnostic information and knowledge sources are
used in the model, it is also possible to obtain related prescriptive information
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and knowledge sources and compliance obligations from the instantiated SRS
repository for a given SRS element using the SRS element view.
The idea of developing a reusable repository or knowledge base was already
pursued in SIREN [130], SREP [73], and the work by Dikanski and Abeck [16].
However, there are several differences concerning the incorporated sources to
be used to fill the repository, and the general approach and concept applied.
The model and instantiation approach pursued in this thesis focus on struc-
turing and reusing multiple existing SRSs with the aim of creating an
organization-specific structure of scope areas, security topics, and relation-
ships between the incorporated SRS elements. The model and the instanti-
ation approach can therefore be used flexibly for any kind of business, for
arbitrary SRSs, and for different kinds of SRE methods. Therefore, the ap-
proach is not limited or specifically designed for a single method or security
standard, but is capable of incorporating different kinds of SRSs relevant for
an organization.
In contrast, existing reuse-oriented approaches either focus on the reuse
of dedicated security standards, or they utilize predefined SRE methods for
the identification of relevant threats or the creation of reusable security re-
quirements for the repository. SIREN is oriented towards the structure and
information provided by MAGERIT and SREP primarily focuses on packages
and profiles from Common Criteria.
Only Dikanski and Abeck [16] and Mellado et al. [73] foresee the incorpo-
ration of a broader focus of different SRSs. However, the model and examples
provided by Dikanski and Abeck are in an early state. Although Mellado et
al. recommend the inclusion of legal, statutory, regulatory, and contractual
requirements, they leave open how this should be done in practice. Therefore,
no approach existed to date that is based upon a categorization of possible
reusable SRSs, nor a model and approach that is capable of flexibly structur-
ing, correlating and providing SRS elements in the form of an organization-
specific SRS repository.
As an example, in the model described in this thesis, the focus is not only
on threats (as a representative of diagnostic information and knowledge) but
weaknesses and vulnerabilities are also incorporated. Moreover, prescriptive
information and knowledge sources, compliance obligations, and results from
SRE methods are possible sources to be integrated.
Another related research direction are security requirements templates [25]
and security requirements patterns [11, 135]. The major difference to them is
that the focus of the work presented in this thesis is on providing a suitable
SRS repository (i.e., an organization-specific structure of scope areas and secu-
rity topics combined with the relationships between the elements and views on
the instantiated model) to understand the security problem space. An instan-
tiated SRS repository intentionally does not prescribe any textual patterns,
templates, or other means of pre-formulated reusable SRs since the intention
is to leave the desired level of detail, the wording, and the number of SRs
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to the discretion of the SRE practitioners. This work is intended to enhance
the understanding of the security problem space for different scope areas and
topics and to provide the required dependencies between the elements from
different SRSs of different categories in order to allow the practitioners to un-
derstand what needs to be avoided and addressed in the problem space (i.e.,
diagnostic information and knowledge), what kind of principles and controls
help to address the problem space (i.e., prescriptive information and knowl-
edge), and which compliance obligations need to be satisfied and for which
reason. Nevertheless, the instantiated model is a potential source for the effi-
cient development of security requirements templates or security requirements
patterns as it offers relevant information and knowledge in a well-structured
form.
5.3 Limitations
The following limitations related to the presented model and evaluation sce-
nario exist:
• Support for security requirements elicitation: The proposed model
is intended to complement existing SRE and security engineering processes
by structuring and reusing SRSs to support the elicitation of SRs.
Nevertheless, there are further undoubted standard activities in SRE pro-
cesses (cf. section 2.1.4), such as the specification of security objectives
and the identification and description of valuable assets to be protected,
which should of course be done in addition since they are also required
for later SRE phases. It is therefore highly recommended embedding the
organization-specific SRS repository into the organization-specific (S)RE
process and aligning it with existing practices and ontologies used in the
organization.
• Placement of the model in the ‘SRE world’: There is no common
agreement on what a security requirement is [18]. As a consequence, there
are various, partly contradictory, definitions of SRs and thus also differ-
ent SR specifications. Existing approaches do not agree on whether the
requirements should be limited to high-level security goals or whether they
should be detailed into security measures. This induces uncertainty among
requirements engineering practitioners about what constitutes good prac-
tice in security requirements engineering. Although the proposed model
of scope areas and security topics is generic and thus could be used for
different levels of granularity, the aim was to design a security-engineering-
focused SRE model in which the elicitation of SRs is necessitated rather
by concrete SRSs than by high-level security objectives.
Moreover, we see the strengths of the model particularly in the context of
incremental development approaches (cf. section 3.1.2). It has not been in-
vestigated so far, whether or not the model can be used in settings where
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only high-level security goals or security core principles (e.g., confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability) are used as model structure elements.
However, during the evaluation, several challenges arose concerning some
overly generic SRS elements that did not really fit into the instantiated
repository. Therefore, the model as well as the presented evaluation sce-
nario must be placed more on the concrete, functional side of SRE.
• The level of detail of scenario-specific SRSs must not deviate
too much: During the evaluation of the model, the experience was made
that the assignment of SRS elements to security topics and the estab-
lishment of relationships between SRS elements that differ significantly in
their level of granularity was very challenging and caused many unhelpful
references. In particular, the mapping related to diagnostic information
and knowledge sources might not always make sense or may ultimately
result in extra effort for revising either the incorporated SRSs or the de-
veloped structure. Thus, usability and the final output depend on the
incorporated SRSs, particularly on their level of detail and the scope they
address. It is therefore highly recommended to carefully select SRSs that
are not mandatory and do not provide an obvious added value in order to
avoid huge discrepancy among SRSs. For instance, in the presented eval-
uation, the list of high-level deliberate threats from [49] were of limited
added value for the instantiated SRS repository.
• Evaluation of the instantiated SRS repository against further
quality indicators: No evaluation was performed on the instantiated
SRS repository against additional quality indicators such as improved ef-
ficiency or enhanced quality. It was discussed and agreed that for this
thesis, the focus of the evaluation would be on applicability and on chal-
lenges with regard to the model and the instantiation approach. Further
aspects that highly depend on the quality and completeness of the incor-
porated SRSs or on the individual knowledge and experience of the test
persons were left out on purpose.
Consequently, other practical evaluations such as the comparison of SR
specifications developed by test persons without security skills using the
instantiated repository and SR specifications created by security experts
without using the instantiated repository were not conducted, since the
informative value of such results would have been very limited with regard
to the contributions of this PhD thesis.
5.4 Potential Future Work
• Classification scheme for SRSs: To ensure that a homogeneous set of
SRSs is available and that SRSs elements fit together prior to the instan-
tiation of an SRSs repository, a classification scheme for the scope and
level of detail of the incorporated SRSs could be developed.
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• Further instantiations and refinement of the model and of the
instantiation approach: Currently, the model and the instantiation ap-
proach were evaluated in a single comprehensive industrial scenario with
a broad scope. To get more evaluation results and to identify potential
additional challenges or hints to consider when instantiating the model,
further evaluations could be conducted. Topics of interest that could be
evaluated are:
– Instantiation of the model by persons who did not use the model and
instantiation approach before.
– Exclusive use of very generic, high-level SRSs for the model instanti-
ation.
– Elaboration of very specific scenarios and use cases such as embedded
devices or web applications.
• Derivation of common, recurring scenarios, use cases, and struc-
tures that can be applied by multiple organizations: Based on
further instantiations, common scenarios, use cases, and recurring struc-
tures could be derived. This would allow deriving typical scope areas and
security topics for specific scenarios and use cases (e.g., web application
development) and proposed assignments and relationships of typical ex-
ternal SRSs for a particular scenario, and providing them to the user
community.

Abbreviations
BDSG Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Federal Data Protection Act
CC Common Criteria
cf. compare, see also
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration
ER Entity Relationship
e.g. for example (from latin ‘exempli gratia’)
FDA Food and Drug Administration
GUI Graphical User Interface
HDP Healthcare Data Protection
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IT Information Technology
ISA International Society of Automation
ISEC Corporate Information Security
ISO International Organization for Standardization
i.e. that is (from latin ‘id est’)
MAGERIT Methodology for Information Systems Risk Analysis and
Management
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
N/A Not Available
PhD Philosophiae Doctor (Doctor of Philosophy)
PHI Protected Health Information
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PMBOK Project Management Body of Knowledge
PSS Product and Solution Security
RE Requirements Engineering
SR Security Requirement
SecRAT Security Requirements Analysis Templates
SDLC System Development Life Cycle
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SIREN SImple REuse of software requiremeNts
SQuaRE Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evaluation
SQUARE Security Quality Requirements Engineering
SRE Security Requirements Engineering
SREP Security Requirements Engineering Process
SRR Security Resources Repository
SRS Security Requirements Source
SSE-CMM Secure Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model
Std. Standard
STRIDE Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure,
Denial of service, Elevation of privilege
STS-ml Socio-Technical System modeling language
TRA Threat and Risk Analysis
UML Unified Modeling Language
UMLSec Unified Modeling Language extended to express
Security-relevant information
XP eXtreme Programming
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